Related papers: Sensitivity analysis for network aggregative games
We address Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize…
In this paper, we use a model of large random network game where the agents plays selfishly and are affected by their neighbors, to explore the conditions under which the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game is affected by a perturbation in…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…
We consider a system of single- or double integrator agents playing a generalized Nash game over a network, in a partial-information scenario. We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem by designing a fully-distributed…
We consider two player quadratic games in a cooperative framework known as social value orientation, motivated by the need to account for complex interactions between humans and autonomous agents in dynamical systems. Social value…
The standard risk minimization paradigm of machine learning is brittle when operating in environments whose test distributions are different from the training distribution due to spurious correlations. Training on data from many…
We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players $n$. Our main result states that for $n$-player binary-action games and for constant $\varepsilon$, the query complexity of an…
In the field of international security, understanding the strategic interactions between countries within a networked context is crucial. Our previous research has introduced a ``games-on-signed graphs'' framework~\cite{LiMorse2022} to…
The problem of the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for aggregative games has been studied over strongly connected and weight-balanced static networks and every time strongly connected and weight-balanced switching networks. In this…
Network games provide a framework to study strategic decision making processes that are governed by structured interdependencies among agents. However, existing models do not account for environments in which agents simultaneously interact…
This paper considers a class of generalized convex games where each player is associated with a convex objective function, a convex inequality constraint and a convex constraint set. The players aim to compute a Nash equilibrium through…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game affects the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, for a fixed interaction graph, we are interested in whether there are pure Nash equilibria arising when random…
Congestion games are attractive because they can model many concrete situations where some competing entities interact through the use of some shared resources, and also because they always admit pure Nash equilibria which correspond to the…
Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games (i.e., asymmetric singleton congestion games) with nonatomic…
In this paper, we study finite-agent linear-quadratic games on graphs. Specifically, we propose a comprehensive framework that extends the existing literature by incorporating heterogeneous and interpretable player interactions. Compared to…