Related papers: Sensitivity analysis for network aggregative games

In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…

A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…

We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash…

Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work,…

Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…

We propose fully-distributed algorithms for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. We first consider the case where local constraints are present and we design an algorithm combining, for each agent, (i) the projected…

This paper studies $n$-person simultaneous-move games with linear best response function, where individuals interact within a given network structure. This class of games have been used to model various settings, such as, public goods,…

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…

Nearly all simulation-based games have environment parameters that affect incentives in the interaction but are not explicitly incorporated into the game model. To understand the impact of these parameters on strategic incentives, typical…

The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…

We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor…

In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed…

Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…

In this work, we investigate an application of a Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm in a social network. In a networked game each player (user) takes action in response to other players' actions in order to decrease (increase) his cost…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…

In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that converges to an NE…

We consider strongly monotone games with convex separable coupling constraints, played by dynamical agents, in a partial-decision information scenario. We start by designing continuous-time fully distributed feedback controllers, based on…

We study public goods games played on networks with possibly non-reciprocal relationships between players. Examples for this type of interactions include one-sided relationships, mutual but unequal relationships, and parasitism. It is well…

We analyse the typical structure of games in terms of the connectivity properties of their best-response graphs. Our central result shows that, among games that are `generic' (without indifferences) and that have a pure Nash equilibrium,…