Related papers: On risk averse competitive equilibrium
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…
In many multiagent domains a set of agents exert effort towards a joint outcome, yet the individual effort levels cannot be easily observed. A typical example for such a scenario is routing in communication networks, where the sender can…
This paper characterizes the equilibrium in a continuous time financial market populated by heterogeneous agents who differ in their rate of relative risk aversion and face convex portfolio constraints. The model is studied in an…
We consider a market setting of agents with additive valuations over heterogeneous divisible resources. Agents are assigned a budget of tokens (possibly unequal budgets) they can use to obtain resources; leftover tokens are worthless. We…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, but with indivisible goods. In this model, every agent has a budget of artificial currency with which to purchase bundles of goods. Equilibrium prices match between…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
Accurate time-to-event prediction is integral to decision-making, informing medical guidelines, hiring decisions, and resource allocation. Survival analysis, the quantitative framework used to model time-to-event data, accounts for patients…
Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known. We consider the setting where player valuations are unknown; using a PAC learning-theoretic framework, we analyze some classes of…
This paper proves, in very general settings, that convex risk minimization is a procedure to select a unique conditional probability model determined by the classification problem. Unlike most previous work, we give results that are general…
We study a simple model of algorithmic collusion in which Q-learning algorithms are designed in a strategic fashion. We let players (\textit{designers}) choose their exploration policy simultaneously prior to letting their algorithms…
We study how to incentivize agents in a target group to produce a higher output in the context of incomplete information, by means of rank-order allocation contests. We describe a symmetric Bayes--Nash equilibrium for contests that have two…
The aims of this study are twofold. First, we consider an optimal risk allocation problem with non-convex preferences. By establishing an infimal representation for distortion risk measures, we give some necessary and sufficient conditions…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
I study how organisations choose selection procedures in a competitive environment. Two firms compete to hire candidates of unknown productivity from a common pool. Firms simultaneously post a selection procedure which consists of a test…
We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…
In optimization problems, the quality of a candidate solution can be characterized by the optimality gap. For most stochastic optimization problems, this gap must be statistically estimated. We show that for risk-averse problems, standard…
We study the formation of derivative prices in equilibrium between risk-neutral agents with heterogeneous beliefs about the dynamics of the underlying. Under the condition that the derivative cannot be shorted, we prove the existence of a…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
We present a novel, game theoretic representation of a multi-agent prediction market using a partially observable stochastic game with information (POSGI). We then describe a correlated equilibrium (CE)-based solution strategy for this game…