Related papers: Detecting Integrity Attacks on Control Systems usi…
Neural networks are increasingly used for intrusion detection on industrial control systems (ICS). With neural networks being vulnerable to adversarial examples, attackers who wish to cause damage to an ICS can attempt to hide their attacks…
In this paper, we introduce a new vulnerability of cyber-physical systems to malicious attack. It arises when the physical plant, that is modeled as a continuous-time LTI system, is controlled by a digital controller. In the sampled-data…
We study the performance of perception-based control systems in the presence of attacks, and provide methods for modeling and analysis of their resiliency to stealthy attacks on both physical and perception-based sensing. Specifically, we…
In this paper, we propose a new architecture to enhance the privacy and security of networked control systems against malicious adversaries. We consider an adversary which first learns the system dynamics (privacy) using system…
This paper is concerned with the analysis and design of secure Distributed Control Systems in the face of integrity attacks on sensors and controllers by external attackers or insiders. In general a DCS consists of many heterogenous…
This paper investigates the security issue of the data replay attacks on the control systems. The attacker is assumed to interfere with the control system process in a steady-state case. The problem is presented as the standard way to…
In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy sensor attacks. We start by defining the notion of stealthy attacks in the most general form by leveraging Neyman-Pearson lemma;…
Past attacks against industrial control systems (ICS) show that adversaries often target both the ICS network and the physical process to achieve potential catastrophic impact. To secure ICS, intrusion detection systems promise timely…
We consider the problem of estimating the state of a time-invariant linear Gaussian system in the presence of integrity attacks. The attacker can compromise $p$ out of $m$ sensors, the set of which is fixed over time and unknown to the…
We address the problem of attack detection and isolation for a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems under (potentially unbounded) sensor attacks and measurement noise. We consider the case when a subset of sensors is subject to additive…
In this paper, we propose an effective and easily deployable approach to detect the presence of stealthy sensor attacks in industrial control systems, where (legacy) control devices critically rely on accurate (and usually non-encrypted)…
Each time that an intrusion detection system raises an alert it must make some attempt to communicate the information to an operator. This communication channel can easily become the target of a denial of service attack because, like all…
Recent works investigated attacks on sensors by influencing analog sensor components with acoustic, light, and electromagnetic signals. Such attacks can have extensive security, reliability, and safety implications since many types of the…
This paper considers a constrained discrete-time linear system subject to actuation attacks. The attacks are modelled as false data injections to the system, such that the total input (control input plus injection) satisfies hard input…
We address the problem of detecting and mitigating the effect of malicious attacks to the sensors of a linear dynamical system. We develop a novel, efficient algorithm that uses a Satisfiability-Modulo-Theory approach to isolate the…
The advantages of using communication networks to interconnect controllers and physical plants motivate the increasing number of Networked Control Systems, in industrial and critical infrastructure facilities. However, this integration also…
As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…
This paper considers the problem of detector tuning against false data injection attacks. In particular, we consider an adversary injecting false sensor data to maximize the state deviation of the plant, referred to as impact, whilst being…
In this paper, we consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation, that is to reliably estimate the true system states despite two classes of attacks: (i) attacks on the switching mechanisms and (ii) false data injection attacks…
This paper studies the impact of side initial state information on the detectability of data deception attacks against cyber-physical systems. We assume the attack detector has access to a linear function of the initial system state that…