Related papers: Value Asymptotics in Dynamic Games on Large Horizo…
For two-person dynamic zero-sum games (both discrete and continuous settings), we investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value…
The paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. We investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity, and the limit of value functions of…
The paper is devoted to dynamic games. We consider a general enough framework, which is not limited to e.g. differential games and could accommodate both discrete and continuous time. Assuming common dynamics, we study two game families…
The paper is concerned with two-person games with saddle point. We investigate the limits of value functions for long-time-average payoff, discounted average payoff, and the payoff that follows a probability density. Most of our assumptions…
This paper proves several Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators, and provides two applications to zero-sum stochastic games where the total payoff is a weighted sum of the stage payoffs. The first application is to provide…
We prove in a dynamic programming framework that uniform convergence of the finite horizon values implies that asymptotically the average accumulated payoff is constant on optimal trajectories. We analyze and discuss several possible…
A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain…
Zero-sum stochastic games generalize the notion of Markov Decision Processes (i.e. controlled Markov chains, or stochastic dynamic programming) to the 2-player competitive case : two players jointly control the evolution of a state…
Nonzero sum games typically have multiple Nash equilibriums (or no equilibrium), and unlike the zero sum case, they may have different values at different equilibriums. Instead of focusing on the existence of individual equilibriums, we…
We prove the dynamic programming principe for uniformly nondegenerate stochastic differential games in the framework of time-homogeneous diffusion processes considered up to the first exit time from a domain. In contrast with previous…
We study the ergodicity of deterministic two-person zero-sum differential games. This property is defined by the uniform convergence to a constant of either the infinite-horizon discounted value as the discount factor tends to zero, or…
We prove a Tauberian theorem for nonexpansive operators, and apply it to the model of zero-sum stochastic game. Under mild assumptions, we prove that the value of the lambda-discounted game v_{lambda} converges uniformly when lambda goes to…
We prove the dynamic programming principe for uniformly nondegenerate stochastic differential games in the framework of time-homogeneous diffusion processes considered up to the first exit time from a domain. The zeroth-order "coefficient"…
Decentralized team problems where players have asymmetric information about the state of the underlying stochastic system have been actively studied, but \emph{games} between such teams are less understood. We consider a general model of…
Dynamic games arise when multiple agents with differing objectives choose control inputs to a dynamic system. Dynamic games model a wide variety of applications in economics, defense, and energy systems. However, compared to single-agent…
The paper is devoted to the asymptotic behavior of value functions of abstract control problem with the long-time and discounted averages. The Uniform Tauberian Theorem for these problems states that the uniform convergence of value…
We analyze a zero-sum stochastic differential game between two competing players who can choose unbounded controls. The payoffs of the game are defined through backward stochastic differential equations. We prove that each player's priority…
We study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games known as \textit{blind stochastic games}, where players neither observe the state nor receive any information about it during the game. A central concept for analyzing long-duration…
We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discrete-time exponential-weights dynamic with a constant step size on all general-sum and symmetric $2 \times 2$ normal-form games, i.e. games with $2$ pure strategies per player, and where the…
We investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information on the payoff and without Isaacs condition. The dynamics is an ordinary differential equation parametrised by two controls chosen by the players. Each player…