Related papers: A Note on a Communication Game

We study a target coverage problem in which a team of sensing agents, operating under limited communication, must collaboratively monitor targets that may be adaptively repositioned by an attacker. We model this interaction as a zero-sum…

We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different…

We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case when the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of…

We consider the problem of estimating `preference' or `strength' parameters in three-way comparison experiments, each composed of a series of paired comparisons, but where only the single `preferred' or `strongest' candidate is known in…

We investigate the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium of constrained network aggregative games to changes in exogenous parameters affecting the cost function of the players. This setting is motivated by two applications. The first is the…

This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…

In a monogamy-of-entanglement (MoE) game, two players who do not communicate try to simultaneously guess a referee's measurement outcome on a shared quantum state they prepared. We study the prototypical example of a game where the referee…

We study a model of strategic coordination based on a class of games with incomplete information known as Global Games. Under the assumption of Poisson-distributed signals and a Gamma prior distribution on state of the system, we…

We study games of chance (e.g., pokers, dices, horse races) in the form of agents' first-order posterior beliefs about game outcomes. We ask for any profile of agents' posterior beliefs, is there a game that can generate these beliefs? We…

This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main…

We identify a subtle security issue that impacts mechanism design in scenarios in which agents can absolutely commit to strategies. Absolute commitments allow the strategy of an agent to depend on the commitments made by the other agents.…

The game in which acts of participants don't have an adequate description in terms of Boolean logic and classical theory of probabilities is considered. The model of the game interaction is constructed on the basis of a non-distributive…

We describe a formulation of multi-agents operating within a Cyber-Physical System, resulting in collaborative or adversarial games. We show that the non-determinism inherent in the communication medium between agents and the underlying…

Bell inequalities limit the possible observations of non-communicating parties. Here, we present analogous inequalities for any number of communicating parties under the causal constraints of static causal order, definite causal order, and…

Schmidt's game, and other similar intersection games have played an important role in recent years in applications to number theory, dynamics, and Diophantine approximation theory. These games are real games, that is, games in which the…

A major open problem in communication complexity is whether or not quantum protocols can be exponentially more efficient than classical protocols on _total_ Boolean functions in the two-party interactive model. The answer appears to be…

This paper develops a unified framework for zero-sum games in which both the pure strategies and the payoff matrices contain complex-valued entries. By leveraging a linear isomorphism between complex and real vector spaces, we extend key…

Game-theoretic motion planners are a potent solution for controlling systems of multiple highly interactive robots. Most existing game-theoretic planners unrealistically assume a priori objective function knowledge is available to all…

In this paper we investigate lossy channel games under incomplete information, where two players operate on a finite set of unbounded FIFO channels and one player, representing a system component under consideration operates under…

Low probability of detection (or covert) communication refers to the scenario where information must be sent reliably to a receiver, but with low probability of detection by an adversary. Recent works on the fundamental limits of this…