Related papers: KeyDrown: Eliminating Keystroke Timing Side-Channe…

This paper investigates how to effectively stop an attacker from using compromised user credentials to gain authorized entry to systems that they are otherwise not authorised to access. The proposed solution extends previous work to move…

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer hardware-assisted means to protect code and data. However, as shown in numerous results over the years, attackers can use side-channels to leak data access patterns and even single-step the code.…

The timing characteristics of cache, a high-speed storage between the fast CPU and the slowmemory, may reveal sensitive information of a program, thus allowing an adversary to conduct side-channel attacks. Existing methods for detecting…

The role of the side channels in the continuous-variable quantum key distribution is studied. It is shown how the information leakage through a side channel from the trusted sender station increases the vulnerability of the protocols to the…

Whereas the embedding distortion, the payload and the robustness of digital watermarking schemes are well understood, the notion of security is still not completely well defined. The approach proposed in the last five years is too…

Side-channel attacks on microprocessors, like the RISC-V, exhibit security vulnerabilities that lead to several design challenges. Hence, it is imperative to study and analyze these security vulnerabilities comprehensively. In this paper,…

In the era of microarchitectural side channels, vendors scramble to deploy mitigations for transient execution attacks, but leave traditional side-channel attacks against sensitive software (e.g., crypto programs) to be fixed by developers…

Security of Android devices is now paramount, given their wide adoption among consumers. As researchers develop tools for statically or dynamically detecting suspicious apps, malware writers regularly update their attack mechanisms to hide…

Timing channels are a significant and growing security threat in computer systems, with no established solution. We have recently argued that the OS must provide time protection, in analogy to the established memory protection, to protect…

When large language model (LLM) systems interact with external data to perform complex tasks, a new attack, namely prompt injection, becomes a significant threat. By injecting instructions into the data accessed by the system, the attacker…

Recently, a number of existing blockchain systems have witnessed major bugs and vulnerabilities within smart contracts. Although the literature features a number of proposals for securing smart contracts, these proposals mostly focus on…

Per Row Activation Counting (PRAC) has emerged as a robust framework for mitigating RowHammer (RH) vulnerabilities in modern DRAM systems. However, we uncover a critical vulnerability: a timing channel introduced by the Alert Back-Off (ABO)…

Microarchitectural timing side channels have been thoroughly investigated as a security threat in hardware designs featuring shared buffers (e.g., caches) or parallelism between attacker and victim task execution. However, contradicting…

Securing neural networks (NNs) against model extraction and parameter exfiltration attacks is an important problem primarily because modern NNs take a lot of time and resources to build and train. We observe that there are no…

Model extraction attacks have been widely applied, which can normally be used to recover confidential parameters of neural networks for multiple layers. Recently, side-channel analysis of neural networks allows parameter extraction even for…

This work presents a novel, black-box software-based countermeasure against physical attacks including power side-channel and fault-injection attacks. The approach uses the concept of random self-reducibility and self-correctness to add…

Side-channel attacks are efficient attacks against cryptographic devices. They use only quantities observable from outside, such as the duration and the power consumption. Attacks against synchronous devices using electric observations are…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow user processes to create enclaves that protect security-sensitive computation against access from the OS kernel and the hypervisor. Recent work has shown that TEEs are vulnerable to side-channel…

Meltdown and Spectre exploit microarchitectural changes the CPU makes during transient out-of-order execution. Using side-channel techniques, these attacks enable leaking arbitrary data from memory. As state-of-the-art software mitigations…

Wearables that constantly collect various sensor data of their users increase the chances for inferences of unintentional and sensitive information such as passwords typed on a physical keyboard. We take a thorough look at the potential of…