Related papers: KeyDrown: Eliminating Keystroke Timing Side-Channe…
Although cryptographic algorithms may be mathematically secure, it is often possible to leak secret information from the implementation of the algorithms. Timing and power side-channel vulnerabilities are some of the most widely considered…
Cloud services have become an essential infrastructure for enterprises and individuals. Access to these cloud services is typically governed by Identity and Access Management systems, where user authentication often relies on passwords.…
Smartwatches enable many novel applications and are fast gaining popularity. However, the presence of a diverse set of on-board sensors provides an additional attack surface to malicious software and services on these devices. In this…
Side-channel attacks have become prominent attack surfaces in cyberspace. Attackers use the side information generated by the system while performing a task. Among the various side-channel attacks, cache side-channel attacks are leading as…
As the Internet of Things (IoT) continues to evolve, smartphones have become essential components of IoT systems. However, with the increasing amount of personal information stored on smartphones, user privacy is at risk of being…
Secret-dependent timing behavior in cryptographic implementations has resulted in exploitable vulnerabilities, undermining their security. Over the years, numerous tools to automatically detect timing leakage or even to prove their absence…
Modern processors are highly optimized systems where every single cycle of computation time matters. Many optimizations depend on the data that is being processed. Software-based microarchitectural attacks exploit effects of these…
Cache timing attacks allow third-party observers to retrieve sensitive information from program executions. But, is it possible to automatically check the vulnerability of a program against cache timing attacks and then, automatically…
Side channel attacks are a major class of attacks to crypto-systems. Attackers collect and analyze timing behavior, I/O data, or power consumption in these systems to undermine their effectiveness in protecting sensitive information. In…
Modern processors dynamically control their operating frequency to optimize resource utilization, maximize energy savings, and conform to system-defined constraints. If, during the execution of a software workload, the running average of…
The "eternal war in cache" has reached browsers, with multiple cache-based side-channel attacks and countermeasures being suggested. A common approach for countermeasures is to disable or restrict JavaScript features deemed essential for…
Cache attacks exploit memory access patterns of cryptographic implementations. Constant-Time implementation techniques have become an indispensable tool in fighting cache timing attacks. These techniques engineer the memory accesses of…
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this…
Recent proposals advocate using keystroke timing signals, specifically the coefficient of variation ($\delta$) of inter-keystroke intervals, to distinguish human-composed text from AI-generated content. We demonstrate that this class of…
Large language models (LLMs) possess extensive knowledge and question-answering capabilities, having been widely deployed in privacy-sensitive domains like finance and medical consultation. During LLM inferences, cache-sharing methods are…
Side-channel attacks on shared hardware resources increasingly threaten confidentiality, especially with the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs). In this work, we introduce Spill The Beans, a novel application of cache side-channels to…
Cache timing attack is a type of side channel attack where the leaking timing information due to the cache behaviour of a crypto system is used by an attacker to break the system. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was considered a secure…
To be secure, cryptographic algorithms crucially rely on the underlying hardware to avoid inadvertent leakage of secrets through timing side channels. Unfortunately, such timing channels are ubiquitous in modern hardware, due to its…
Side-channel attacks on mobile devices have gained increasing attention since their introduction in 2007. While traditional side-channel attacks, such as power analysis attacks and electromagnetic analysis attacks, required physical…
Timing channels in cache hierarchies are an important enabler in many microarchitectural attacks. ScatterCache (USENIX 2019) is a protected cache architecture that randomizes the address-to-index mapping with a keyed cryptographic function,…