Related papers: Principal-Agent Problem with Common Agency without…
Consider a multi-agent systems setup in which a principal (a supervisor agent) assigns subtasks to specialized agents and aggregates their responses into a single system-level output. A core property of such systems is information…
We consider cooperative multi-agent consensus optimization problems over an undirected network of agents, where only those agents connected by an edge can directly communicate. The objective is to minimize the sum of agent-specific…
Heterogeneous networks comprise agents with varying capabilities in terms of computation, storage, and communication. In such settings, it is crucial to factor in the operating characteristics in allowing agents to choose appropriate…
A principal contracts with an agent who sequentially searches over projects to generate a prize. The principal initially knows only one of the agent's available projects and evaluates a contract by its worst-case performance. We…
We consider moral hazard problems where a principal has access to rich monitoring data about an agent's action. Rather than focusing on optimal contracts (which are known to in general be complicated), we characterize the optimal rate at…
This paper addresses the problem of collaboratively satisfying long-term spatial constraints in multi-agent systems. Each agent is subject to spatial constraints, expressed as inequalities, which may depend on the positions of other agents…
This work studies the online contract design problem. The principal's goal is to learn the optimal contract that maximizes her utility through repeated interactions, without prior knowledge of the agent's type (i.e., the agent's cost and…
This paper explores the economic interactions within modern crowdsourcing markets. In these markets, employers issue requests for tasks, platforms facilitate the recruitment of crowd workers, and workers complete tasks for monetary rewards.…
Firms have access to abundant data on market participants. They use these data to target contracts to agents with specific characteristics, and describe these contracts in opaque terms. In response to such practices, recent proposed…
A general time-inconsistent optimal control problem is considered for stochastic differential equations with deterministic coefficients. Under suitable conditions, a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman type equation is derived for the equilibrium value…
This paper studies optimal consensus tracking problem of heterogeneous linear multi-agent systems. By introducing tracking error dynamics, the optimal tracking problem is reformulated as finding a Nash-equilibrium solution of a multi-player…
This paper studies contracting in the presence of externalities with a non-contractible outsider. Multiple equilibria arise from strategic symmetry between the insider agent and the outsider. To address strategic uncertainty, the principal…
We present a method for collisionless multi-agent path planning using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Because the method is rooted in optimal control theory and partial differential equations, it avoids the need for hierarchical…
An optimal control problem is considered for a stochastic differential equation containing a state-dependent regime switching, with a recursive cost functional. Due to the non-exponential discounting in the cost functional, the problem is…
The problem of controlling multi-agent systems under different models of information sharing among agents has received significant attention in the recent literature. In this paper, we consider a setup where rather than committing to a…
In this paper, we extend the Holmstro\"om and Milgrom problem [47] by adding uncertainty about the volatility of the output for both the Agent and the Principal. We study more precisely the impact of the "Nature" playing against the Agent…
Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios…
We initiate the study of online contracts, which integrate the game-theoretic considerations of economic contract theory, with the algorithmic and informational challenges of online algorithm design. Our starting point is the classic online…
We study a setting in which a principal selects an agent to execute a collection of tasks according to a specified priority sequence. Agents, however, have their own individual priority sequences according to which they wish to execute the…
Optimization problems in process engineering, including design and operation, can often pose challenges to many solvers: multi-modal, non-smooth, and discontinuous models often with large computational requirements. In such cases, the…