Related papers: An adverse selection approach to power pricing
In this article, we employ a principal-agent model to analyze optimal contract design in a monopolistic reinsurance market under adverse selection with a continuum of insurer types. Instead of using the classical expected utility framework,…
According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex…
We consider the principal-agent problem with heterogeneous agents. Previous works assume that the principal signs independent incentive contracts with every agent to make them invest more efforts on the tasks. However, in many…
The energy transition is expected to significantly increase the share of renewable energy sources whose production is intermittent in the electricity mix. Apart from key benefits, this development has the major drawback of generating a…
Adverse selection is a version of the principal-agent problem that includes monopolist nonlinear pricing, where a monopolist with known costs seeks a profit-maximizing price menu facing a population of potential consumers whose preferences…
We propose a distributionally robust principal agent formulation, which generalizes some common variants of worst-case and Bayesian principal agent problems. We construct a theoretical framework to certify whether any surjective contract…
This paper considers the problem of shaping agent utility functions in a transactive energy system to ensure the optimal energy price at a competitive equilibrium is always socially acceptable, that is, below a prescribed threshold. Agents…
The increasing penetration of renewable energy poses significant challenges to power grid reliability. There have been increasing interests in utilizing financial tools, such as insurance, to help end-users hedge the potential risk of lost…
In the combinatorial action model of contract design, a principal delegates a complex project to an agent, incentivizing a subset of actions from a ground set of $n$ actions, via a linear contract. Computing the optimal contract is a…
This paper deals with the market-bidding problem of a cluster of price-responsive consumers of electricity. We develop an inverse optimization scheme that, recast as a bilevel programming problem, uses price-consumption data to estimate the…
This work studies the online contract design problem. The principal's goal is to learn the optimal contract that maximizes her utility through repeated interactions, without prior knowledge of the agent's type (i.e., the agent's cost and…
I analyze long-term contracting in insurance markets with asymmetric information. The buyer privately observes her risk type, which evolves stochastically over time. A long-term contract specifies a menu of insurance policies, contingent on…
Principal-agent problems model scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to take costly, unobservable actions through the provision of payments. Such problems are ubiquitous in several real-world applications, ranging from…
We design an optimal contract between a demand response aggregator (DRA) and power grid customers for incentive-based demand response. We consider a setting in which the customers are asked to reduce their electricity consumption by the DRA…
This paper proposes a method to design an optimal dynamic contract between a principal and an agent, who has the authority to control both the principal's revenue and an engineered system. The key characteristic of our problem setting is…
The problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided a rich body of structural and algorithmic insights into this…
We investigate the problem of a principal looking to contract an expert to provide a probability forecast for a categorical event. We assume all experts have a common public prior on the event's probability, but can form more accurate…
The increase of renewables in the grid and the volatility of the load create uncertainties in the day-ahead prices of electricity markets. Adaptive robust optimization (ARO) and stochastic optimization have been used to make commitment and…
Accurate prediction of electricity prices plays an essential role in the electricity market. To reflect the uncertainty of electricity prices, price intervals are predicted. This paper proposes a novel prediction interval construction…
We study the problems of pricing an indivisible product to consumers who are embedded in a given social network. The goal is to maximize the revenue of the seller. We assume impatient consumers who buy the product as soon as the seller…