Related papers: Selling Complementary Goods: Dynamics, Efficiency …

This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at some pre-determined fixed price. A population of consumers is spread out over the real line, and the two firms simultaneously choose location in…

We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits and buyers have utility limits. Beyond natural applications in economics, these markets arise in the context of maximizing Nash social welfare when…

Pharmaceutical markets for life-saving therapies combine monopoly power with insurance coverage. We build a tractable sequential game in which a patent-holder chooses the drug price, a profit-maximising insurer sets its premium, and a…

We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism…

This paper examines public goods and evaluates the mechanism through the game theory. Public goods are characterized by nonexclusivity and nonrivalry and this creates fundamental challenges for allocation. We analyze why competitive markets…

We introduce a class of Bayesian bidding games for which we prove that the set of pure Nash equilibria is a (non-empty) sublattice and we give a sufficient condition for uniqueness that is often verified in the context of markets with…

The fair division of resources is an important age-old problem that has led to a rich body of literature. At the center of this literature lies the question of whether there exist fair mechanisms despite strategic behavior of the agents. A…

We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest…

We introduce a game model called "customer attraction game" to demonstrate the competition among online content providers. In this model, customers exhibit interest in various topics. Each content provider selects one topic and benefits…

We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, but with indivisible goods. In this model, every agent has a budget of artificial currency with which to purchase bundles of goods. Equilibrium prices match between…

Many economic transactions, including those of online markets, have a time lag between the start and end times of transactions. Customers need to wait for completion of their transaction (order fulfillment) and hence are also interested in…

The complex interactions between algorithmic trading agents can have a severe influence on the functioning of our economy, as witnessed by recent banking crises and trading anomalies. A common phenomenon in these situations are fire sales,…

Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we unearth a folk theorem: if they are sufficiently patient,…

We study the Proportional Response dynamic in exchange economies, where each player starts with some amount of money and a good. Every day, the players bring one unit of their good and submit bids on goods they like, each good gets…

We study the economic interactions among sellers and buyers in online markets. In such markets, buyers have limited information about the product quality, but can observe the sellers' reputations which depend on their past transaction…

In this paper, the optimal pricing strategy in Avellande-Stoikov's for a monopolistic dealer is extended to a general situation where multiple dealers are present in a competitive market. The dealers' trading intensities, their optimal bid…

We consider two competing platforms operating in a two-sided market and offering identical services to their customers at potentially different prices. The objective of each platform is to maximize its throughput or revenue by suitably…

Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this game, in which the agents' surplus (expected sum of payo s) is…

We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…

Separate selling of two independent goods is shown to yield at least 62% of the optimal revenue, and at least 73% when the goods satisfy the Myerson regularity condition. This improves the 50% result of Hart and Nisan (2017, originally…