Related papers: Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: C…
Incorporating fairness criteria in optimization problems comes at a certain cost, which is measured by the so-called price of fairness. Here we consider the allocation of indivisible goods. For envy-freeness as fairness criterion it is…
The goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a "fair" way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods,…
We study a fair division model where indivisible items arrive sequentially, and must be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Previous work on online fair division has shown impossibility results in achieving approximate envy-freeness…
The online bipartite matching problem, extensively studied in the literature, deals with the allocation of online arriving vertices (items) to a predetermined set of offline vertices (agents). However, little attention has been given to the…
Fair allocation of indivisible items among agents is a fundamental and extensively studied problem. However, fairness does not have a single universally accepted definition, leading to a variety of competing fairness notions. Some of these…
The fair division of indivisible goods is not only a subject of theoretical research, but also an important problem in practice, with solutions being offered on several online platforms. Little is known, however, about the characteristics…
In the allocation of resources to a set of agents, how do fairness guarantees impact the social welfare? A quantitative measure of this impact is the price of fairness, which measures the worst-case loss of social welfare due to fairness…
A simple mechanism for allocating indivisible resources is sequential allocation in which agents take turns to pick items. We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems, checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or…
Equitability is a well-studied fairness notion in fair division, where an allocation is equitable if all agents receive equal utility from their allocation. For indivisible items, an exactly equitable allocation may not exist, and a natural…
We consider allocating indivisible goods with provable fairness guarantees that are satisfied regardless of which bundle of items each agent receives. Symmetrical allocations of this type are known to exist for divisible resources, such as…
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…
We study the fair division of divisible bad resources with strategic agents who can manipulate their private information to get a better allocation. Within certain constraints, we are particularly interested in whether truthful envy-free…
We revisit the setting of fairly allocating indivisible items when agents have different weights representing their entitlements. First, we propose a parameterized family of relaxations for weighted envy-freeness and the same for weighted…
Inheritances, divorces or liquidations of companies require common assets to be divided among the entitled parties. Legal methods usually consider the market value of goods, while fair division theory takes into account the parties'…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods with variable groups. In this model, the goal is to partition the agents into groups of given sizes and allocate the goods to the groups in a fair manner. We show that for any number of…
Fair allocation has been studied intensively in both economics and computer science, and fair sharing of resources has aroused renewed interest with the advent of virtualization and cloud computing. Prior work has typically focused on…
Envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency are two major goals in welfare economics. The existence of an allocation that satisfies both conditions has been studied for a long time. Whether items are indivisible or divisible, it is impossible to…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is on the case where the goods are indivisible…
It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…