Related papers: Deterministic, Strategyproof, and Fair Cake Cuttin…
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other.…
Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…
We consider the classic cake-cutting problem of producing envy-free allocations, restricted to the case of four agents. The problem asks for a partition of the cake to four agents, so that every agent finds her piece at least as valuable as…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…
Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual…
Machine learning algorithms in socially sensitive domains (e.g., credit decisions) often focus on equalizing predictive outcomes. However, satisfying these metrics does not guarantee that models use the same reasoning for different groups.…
This work develops algorithmic results for the classic cake-cutting problem in which a divisible, heterogeneous resource (modeled as a cake) needs to be partitioned among agents with distinct preferences. We focus on a standard formulation…
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…
This paper introduces TEDI (Truthful, Expressive, and Dimension-Insensitive approach), a discretization-free algorithm to learn truthful and utility-maximizing mechanisms. Existing learning-based approaches often rely on discretization of…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
In this paper, we study a problem of truthful mechanism design for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in a both payment-free and prior-free environment. In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a…
We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may…
We study the recently introduced cake-cutting setting in which the cake is represented by an undirected graph. This generalizes the canonical interval cake and allows for modeling the division of road networks. We show that when the graph…
Fair division with unequal shares is an intensively studied recourse allocation problem. For $ i\in [n] $, let $ \mu_i $ be an atomless probability measure on the measurable space $(C,\mathcal{S}) $ and let $ t_i $ be positive numbers…
In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives -- modeled as a set. In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by…
We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure…
We study the discrete variation of the classical cake-cutting problem where n players divide a 1-dimensional cake with exactly (n-1) cuts, replacing the continuous, infinitely divisible "cake" with a necklace of discrete, indivisible…
We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical…
The design of algorithms for political redistricting generally takes one of two approaches: optimize an objective such as compactness or, drawing on fair division, construct a protocol whose outcomes guarantee partisan fairness. We aim to…
The cake-cutting problem involves dividing a heterogeneous, divisible resource fairly between $n$ agents. Br\^{a}nzei et al. [6] introduced {\em generalised cut and choose} (GCC) protocols, a formal model for representing cake-cutting…