Related papers: Leveraging Intel SGX to Create a Nondisclosure Cry…
This paper presents SgxPectre Attacks that exploit the recently disclosed CPU bugs to subvert the confidentiality and integrity of SGX enclaves. Particularly, we show that when branch prediction of the enclave code can be influenced by…
Encrypted databases have been studied for more than 10 years and are quickly emerging as a critical technology for the cloud. The current state of the art is to use property-preserving encrypting techniques (e.g., deterministic encryption)…
The big data industry is facing new challenges as concerns about privacy leakage soar. One of the remedies to privacy breach incidents is to encapsulate computations over sensitive data within hardware-assisted Trusted Execution…
Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) is a promising technology to securely process information in otherwise untrusted environments. An important aspect of Intel SGX is the ability to perform remote attestation to assess the…
With the evolution of computer systems, the amount of sensitive data to be stored as well as the number of threats on these data grow up, making the data confidentiality increasingly important to computer users. Currently, with devices…
Since its debut, SGX has been used in many applications, e.g., secure data processing. However, previous systems usually assume a trusted enclave and ignore the security issues caused by an untrusted enclave. For instance, a vulnerable (or…
Intel SGX is known to be vulnerable to a class of practical attacks exploiting memory access pattern side-channels, notably page-fault attacks and cache timing attacks. A promising hardening scheme is to wrap applications in hardware…
Process-based confidential computing enclaves such as Intel SGX can be used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of workloads, without the overhead of virtualisation. However, they introduce a notable performance overhead,…
In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical, side-channel attack against Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), called a branch shadowing attack, which can reveal fine-grained control flows (i.e., each branch) of an enclave program running…
A trusted execution environment (TEE) such as Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) runs a remote attestation to prove to a data owner the integrity of the initial state of an enclave, including the program to operate on her data. For this…
We explore the use of SGX enclaves as a means to improve the security of handling keys and data in storage systems. We study two main configurations for SGX computations, as they apply to performing data-at-rest encryption in a storage…
Modern CPU architectures offer strong isolation guarantees towards user applications in the form of enclaves. For instance, Intel's threat model for SGX assumes fully trusted enclaves, yet there is an ongoing debate on whether this threat…
A protocol for two-party secure function evaluation (2P-SFE) aims to allow the parties to learn the output of function $f$ of their private inputs, while leaking nothing more. In a sense, such a protocol realizes a trusted oracle that…
Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…
Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to software-based side-channel attacks. In a common attack, the adversary monitors CPU caches to infer secret-dependent data accesses patterns. Known defenses have major…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are an integral part of modern secure processors. They ensure that their application and code pages are confidential, tamper proof and immune to diverse types of attacks. In 2021, Intel suddenly…
Hardware-supported security mechanisms like Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provide strong security guarantees, which are particularly relevant in cloud settings. However, their reliance on physical hardware conflicts with cloud…
Besides Intel's SGX technology, there are long-running discussions on how trusted computing technologies can be used to cloak malware. Past research showed example methods of malicious activities utilising Flicker, Trusted Platform Module,…
Hardware support for trusted execution in modern CPUs enables tenants to shield their data processing workloads in otherwise untrusted cloud environments. Runtime systems for the trusted execution must rely on an interface to the untrusted…
Searchable encryption (SE) is one of the key enablers for building encrypted databases. It allows a cloud server to search over encrypted data without decryption. Dynamic SE additionally includes data addition and deletion operations to…