Related papers: A phenomenological analysis of eco-evolutionary co…
Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of cooperation. In the present article, we use the prisoner's dilemma (PD)…
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation,…
Microscopic strategy update rules play an important role in the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation among interacting agents on complex networks. Many previous related works only consider one \emph{fixed} rule, while in the real world,…
Maintenance of cooperation was studied for a two-strategy evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players are located on a one-dimensional chain and their payoff comes from games with the nearest and next-nearest neighbor…
Recently, the eco-evolutionary game theory which describes the coupled dynamics of strategies and environment have attracted great attention. At the same time, most of the current work is focused on the classic two-player two-strategy game.…
It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
The evolution of cooperative behaviour is studied in the deterministic version of the Prisoners' Dilemma on a two-dimensional lattice. The payoff parameter is set at the critical region $1.8 < b < 2.0$ , where clusters of cooperators are…
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I…
Due to the conventional distinction between ecological (rapid) and evolutionary (slow)timescales, ecological and population models to date have typically ignored the effects of evolution. Yet the potential for rapid evolutionary change has…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…
Evolutionary game theory, encompassing discrete, continuous, and mixed strategies, is pivotal for understanding cooperation dynamics. Discrete strategies involve deterministic actions with a fixed probability of one, whereas continuous…
Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner's dilemma, and to…
Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…
One of the best examples of traditional analysis of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) is provided by the so called Dove-Hawk model. In this paper we present several enhancements to the model aimed at describing the evolution of…
Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying…
Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…