Related papers: Competitive Equilibrium For Almost All Incomes: Ex…

We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm. Prior work showed that there exists an allocation that satisfies…

We study the problem of determining an envy-free allocation of indivisible goods among multiple agents with additive valuations. EFX, which stands for envy-freeness up to any good, is a well-studied relaxation of the envy-free allocation…

The origin of economic crises is a key problem for economics. We present a model of long-run competitive markets to show that the multiplicity of behaviors in an economic system, over a long time scale, emerge as statistical regularities…

We study the problem of designing truthful and fair mechanisms when allocating a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods. We first show that there does not exist an EFM (envy-free for mixed goods) and truthful mechanism in general. This…

We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free). Mechanisms…

Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…

We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and…

We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…

Existing efforts to formulate computational definitions of fairness have largely focused on distributional notions of equality, where equality is defined by the resources or decisions given to individuals in the system. Yet existing…

Envy-freeness is a standard benchmark of fairness in resource allocation. Since it cannot always be satisfied when the resource consists of indivisible items even when there are two agents, the relaxations envy-freeness up to one item (EF1)…

We study Fisher markets that admit equilibria wherein each good is integrally assigned to some agent. While strong existence and computational guarantees are known for equilibria of Fisher markets with additive valuations, such equilibria,…

We investigate the efficiency of fair allocations of indivisible goods using the well-studied price of fairness concept. Previous work has focused on classical fairness notions such as envy-freeness, proportionality, and equitability.…

We study fair resource allocation with strategic agents. It is well-known that, across multiple fundamental problems in this domain, truthfulness and fairness are incompatible. For example, when allocating indivisible goods, no truthful and…

We study a spatially homogeneous model of a market where several agents or companies compete for a wealth resource. In analogy with ecological systems the simplest case of such models shows a kind of "competitive exclusion" principle.…

We continue the study of Bochet et al. and Moulin and Sethuraman on fair allocation in bipartite networks. In these models, there is a moneyless market, in which a non-storable, homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with…

A collection of objects, some of which are good and some are bad, is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely…

We formulate the problem of fair and efficient completion of indivisible goods, defined as follows: Given a partial allocation of indivisible goods among agents, does there exist an allocation of the remaining goods (i.e., a completion)…

This paper addresses the problem of energy sharing between a population of price-taking agents who adopt decentralized primal-dual gradient dynamics to find the Competitive Equilibrium (CE). Although the CE is efficient, it does not ensure…

The ``impossibility theorem'' -- which is considered foundational in algorithmic fairness literature -- asserts that there must be trade-offs between common notions of fairness and performance when fitting statistical models, except in two…

The notion of \emph{envy-freeness} is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are unfortunately not guaranteed to exist. Classical works have avoided this issue by…