Related papers: Safe and Nested Subgame Solving for Imperfect-Info…

In this paper, we present a novel, game-theoretic model of deception in two-player, zero-sum games. Our framework leverages an information asymmetry: one player (the deceiver) has access to accurate payoff information, while the other (the…

With the increasing sophistication of attacks on cyber-physical systems, deception has emerged as an effective tool to improve system security and safety by obfuscating the attacker's perception. In this paper, we present a solution to the…

Imitation is simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to deal with one's own problems. Because success of imitation generally depends on whether profit of an imitating agent coincides with those of other agents or…

From the very dawn of the field, search with value functions was a fundamental concept of computer games research. Turing's chess algorithm from 1950 was able to think two moves ahead, and Shannon's work on chess from $1950$ includes an…

We design and analyze minimax-optimal algorithms for online linear optimization games where the player's choice is unconstrained. The player strives to minimize regret, the difference between his loss and the loss of a post-hoc benchmark…

Notion of strategy in game theory is static and presumably constructed before the game play. The static, pre-determined notion of strategies falls short analyzing perfect information games. Because, we, people, do not strategize as such…

We study an infinite-horizon discrete-time optimal stopping problem under non-exponential discounting. A new method, which we call the iterative approach, is developed to find subgame perfect Nash equilibria. When the discount function…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…

In an adversarial environment, a hostile player performing a task may behave like a non-hostile one in order not to reveal its identity to an opponent. To model such a scenario, we define identity concealment games: zero-sum stochastic…

Imperfect-information multiplayer games test whether agents can act under hidden information, sparse rewards, and non-stationary opponents. We study these challenges in Big 2, a four-player imperfect-information card game. We develop a…

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…

A game-theoretic framework for time-inconsistent stopping problems where the time-inconsistency is due to the consideration of a non-linear function of an expected reward is developed. A class of mixed strategy stopping times that allows…

Advances in intelligent game playing agents have led to successes in perfect information games like Go and imperfect information games like Poker. The Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (ISMCTS) family of algorithms outperforms…

Differences in perception, information asymmetries, and bounded rationality lead game-theoretic players to derive a private, subjective view of the game that may diverge from the underlying ground-truth scenario and may be misaligned with…

Model checking of strategic ability under imperfect information is known to be hard. The complexity results range from NP-completeness to undecidability, depending on the precise setup of the problem. No less importantly, fixpoint…

Many interactions result in a socially suboptimal equilibrium, or in a non-equilibrium state, from which arriving at an equilibrium through simple dynamics can be impossible of too long. Aiming to achieve a certain equilibrium, we persuade,…

We expand on earlier research on the topic by discussing an infinitely repeated game model with a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile (SPE) as a solution concept that diminishes incentives to violate speed limits in a carrot and…

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with $K$ time steps and a player action space of size $U$, the game tree complexity is $U^{2K}$, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite $(U,K)$,…

This paper introduces an information-theoretic method for selecting a subset of problems which gives the most information about a group of problem-solving algorithms. This method was tested on the games in the General Video Game AI (GVGAI)…