Related papers: Formal Computational Unlinkability Proofs of RFID …

We present the Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF) for developing and checking complete proofs of security for cryptographic schemes within a proof assistant. This is a general-purpose framework that is capable of modeling and…

In this paper, we consider the problem of verifying anonymity and unlinkability in the symbolic model, where protocols are represented as processes in a variant of the applied pi calculus, notably used in the ProVerif tool. Existing tools…

We present a formal logic for quantitative reasoning about security properties of network protocols. The system allows us to derive concrete security bounds that can be used to choose key lengths and other security parameters. We provide…

We propose a theoretical framework to quantitatively describe Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), including extensions to quantum protocols, so-called Quantum Readout PUFs (QR-PUFs). (QR-) PUFs are physical systems with challenge-response…

We consider repeated communication sessions between a RFID Tag (e.g., Radio Frequency Identification, RFID Tag) and a RFID Verifier. A proactive information theoretic security scheme is proposed. The scheme is based on the assumption that…

Consider the problem of verifying security properties of a cryptographic protocol coded in C. We propose an automatic solution that needs neither a pre-existing protocol description nor manual annotation of source code. First, symbolically…

We present the design, implementation, and foundation of a verifier for higher-order functional programs with generics and recursive data types. Our system supports proving safety and termination using preconditions, postconditions and…

We formalize the simulation paradigm of cryptography in terms of category theory and show that protocols secure against abstract attacks form a symmetric monoidal category, thus giving an abstract model of composable security definitions in…

Although good encryption functions are probabilistic, most symbolic models do not capture this aspect explicitly. A typical solution, recently used to prove the soundness of such models with respect to computational ones, is to explicitly…

Universal Composability (UC) is the gold standard for cryptographic security, but mechanizing proofs of UC is notoriously difficult. A recently-discovered connection between UC and Robust Compilation (RC)$\unicode{x2014}$a novel theory of…

We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…

We propose a security verification framework for cryptographic protocols using machine learning. In recent years, as cryptographic protocols have become more complex, research on automatic verification techniques has been focused on. The…

We study linking attacks on communication protocols. We show that an active attacker is strictly more powerful in this setting than previously-considered passive attackers. We introduce a formal model to reason about active linkability…

In this paper, we propose an HB-like protocol for privacy-preserving authentication of RFID tags, whereby a tag can remain anonymous and untraceable to an adversary during the authentication process. Previous proposals of such protocols…

Authenticated data structures allow untrusted third parties to carry out operations which produce proofs that can be used to verify an operation's output. Such data structures are challenging to develop and implement correctly. This paper…

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a promising solution for identity verification and asymmetric encryption. In this paper, a new Resistive Random Access Memory (ReRAM) PUF-based protocol is presented to create a physical ReRAM PUF…

Relay attacks are a major concern for RFID systems: during an authentication process an adversary transparently relays messages between a verifier and a remote legitimate prover. We present an authentication protocol suited for RFID…

This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif.CryptoVerif does not rely on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy, correspondence (which include authentication), and…

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a key technology used in many applications. In the past decades, plenty of secure and privacy-preserving RFID tag/mutual authentication protocols as well as formal frameworks for evaluating them have…

Cryptographic protocols are hard to design and prove correct, as witnessed by the ever-growing list of attacks even on protocol standards. Symbolic models of cryptography enable automated formal security proofs of such protocols against an…