Related papers: False Data Injection Attacks on Phasor Measurement…
False data injection attacks (FDIAs) pose a persistent challenge to AC power system state estimation. In current practice, detection relies primarily on topology-aware residual-based tests that assume malicious measurements can be…
In this paper, we consider the problems of state estimation and false data injection detection in smart grid when the measurements are corrupted by colored Gaussian noise. By modeling the noise with the autoregressive process, we estimate…
Real time operation of the power grid and synchronism of its different elements require accurate estimation of its state variables. Errors in state estimation will lead to sub-optimal Optimal Power Flow (OPF) solutions and subsequent…
Phishing sites continue to grow in volume and sophistication. Recent work leverages large language models (LLMs) to analyze URLs, HTML, and rendered content to decide whether a website is a phishing site. While these approaches are…
The resilience of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for electric power networks for certain cyber-attacks is considered. We analyze the vulnerability of the measurement system to false data attack on communicated…
This paper investigates the vulnerability of bilateral teleoperation systems to perfectly undetectable False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs). Teleoperation, one of the major applications in robotics, involves a leader manipulator operated by…
False data injection attacks (FDIAs) represent a major class of attacks that aim to break the integrity of measurements by injecting false data into the smart metering devices in power grids. To the best of authors' knowledge, no study has…
This paper introduces an algorithm able to detect and localize the occurrance of a fault in an Active Distribution Network, using the measurements collected by Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs). First, a basic algorithm that works under the…
This paper introduces a novel, fully distributed control framework for DC microgrids, enhancing resilience against exponentially unbounded false data injection (EU-FDI) attacks. Our framework features a consensus-based secondary control for…
Modern processors widely equip the Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) to collect various architecture and microarchitecture events. Software developers often utilize the PMU to enhance program's performance, but the potential side effects…
This paper addresses the challenge of amplitude-unbounded false data injection (FDI) attacks targeting the sensor-to-controller (S-C) channel in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We introduce a resilient tube-based model predictive control…
Motivated by the sequential detection of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) in a dynamic smart grid, we consider a more general problem of sequentially detecting time-varying FDIAs in dynamic linear regression models. The unknown…
Training and evaluating false data injection attack (FDIA) detectors for power systems is constrained by data scarcity. Operational grid measurements are commercially sensitive, and hand-crafted attacks fail to capture complex…
Understanding smart grid cyber attacks is key for developing appropriate protection and recovery measures. Advanced attacks pursue maximized impact at minimized costs and detectability. This paper conducts risk analysis of combined data…
Machine learning (ML)-based detectors have been shown to be effective in detecting stealthy false data injection attacks (FDIAs) that can bypass conventional bad data detectors (BDDs) in power systems. However, ML models are also vulnerable…
Sensors called phasor measurement units (PMUs) are used to monitor the electric power network. The power domination problem seeks to minimize the number of PMUs needed to monitor the network. We extend the power domination problem and…
Fast and accurate knowledge of power flows and power injections is needed for a variety of applications in the electric grid. Phasor measurement units (PMUs) can be used to directly compute them at high speeds; however, a large number of…
The integration of information and physical systems in modern power grids has heightened vulnerabilities to False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), threatening the secure operation of power cyber-physical systems (CPS). This paper reviews…
This paper demonstrates that false data injection (FDI) attacks are extremely limited in their ability to cause physical consequences on $N-1$ reliable power systems operating with real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security…
State estimation estimates the system condition in real-time and provides a base case for other energy management system (EMS) applications including real-time contingency analysis and security-constrained economic dispatch. Recent work in…