Related papers: Stable Secretaries
The prophet and secretary problems demonstrate online scenarios involving the optimal stopping theory. In a typical prophet or secretary problem, selection decisions are assumed to be immediate and irrevocable. However, many online settings…
The stable marriage problem, as addressed by Gale and Shapely [1] consists of providing a bipartite matching between n " boys " and n " girls "-each of whom have a totally ordered preference list over the other set-such that there exists no…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
We introduce and study a new model that we call the {\em matching model}. Items arrive one by one in a buffer and depart from it as soon as possible but by pairs. The items of a departing pair are said to be {\em matched}. There is a finite…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
Following up a recent work by Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno, we study a stable matching problem with unequal numbers of men and women, and independent uniform preferences. The asymptotic formulas for the expected number of stable matchings,…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
We show that the ratio of matched individuals to blocking pairs grows linearly with the number of propose--accept rounds executed by the Gale--Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem. Consequently, the participants can arrive at…
Consider a one-to-one two-sided matching market with workers on one side and single-position firms on the other, and suppose that the largest individually rational matching contains $n$ pairs. We show that the number of workers employed and…
Within the context of stochastic probing with commitment, we consider the online stochastic matching problem; that is, the one sided online bipartite matching problem where edges adjacent to an online node must be probed to determine if…
In this paper we introduce the hiring under uncertainty problem to model the questions faced by hiring committees in large enterprises and universities alike. Given a set of $n$ eligible candidates, the decision maker needs to choose the…
Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
In the matroid secretary problem, the elements of a matroid $\mathcal{M}$ arrive in random order. Once we observe an item we need to irrevocably decide whether or not to accept it. The set of selected elements should form an independent set…
We present a fascinating model that has lately caught attention among physicists working in complexity related fields. Though it originated from mathematics and later from economics, the model is very enlightening in many aspects that we…
We study the problem of solving Packing Integer Programs (PIPs) in the online setting, where columns in $[0,1]^d$ of the constraint matrix are revealed sequentially, and the goal is to pick a subset of the columns that sum to at most $B$ in…