Related papers: Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks

We explored the Patrol Security Game (PSG), a robotic patrolling problem modeled as an extensive-form Stackelberg game, where the attacker determines the timing, location, and duration of their attack. Our objective is to devise a…

Attack detection is usually approached as a classification problem. However, standard classification tools often perform poorly because an adaptive attacker can shape his attacks in response to the algorithm. This has led to the recent…

We consider a two-player zero-sum network routing game in which a router wants to maximize the amount of legitimate traffic that flows from a given source node to a destination node and an attacker wants to block as much legitimate traffic…

Many Machine Learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks: There exist methodologies that add a small (imperceptible) perturbation to an input such that the model comes up with a wrong prediction. Better understanding of such…

We revisit a one-step control problem over an adversarial packet-dropping link. The link is modeled as a set of binary channels controlled by a strategic jammer whose intention is to wage a `denial of service' attack on the plant by…

In classic network security games, the defender distributes defending resources to the nodes of the network, and the attacker attacks a node, with the objective to maximize the damage caused. Existing models assume that the attack at node u…

We study the problem of sensor scheduling for an intrusion detection task. We model this as a two-player zero-sum game over a graph, where the defender (Player 1) seeks to identify the optimal strategy for scheduling sensor orientations to…

Securing dynamic networks against adversarial actions is challenging because of the need to anticipate and counter strategic disruptions by adversarial entities within complex network structures. Traditional game-theoretic models, while…

This article considers a two-player strategic game for network routing under link disruptions. Player 1 (defender) routes flow through a network to maximize her value of effective flow while facing transportation costs. Player 2 (attacker)…

In adversarial patrolling games, a mobile Defender strives to discover intrusions at vulnerable targets initiated by an Attacker. The Attacker's utility is traditionally defined as the probability of completing an attack, possibly weighted…

Cyber security is one of the most significant technical challenges in current times. Detecting adversarial activities, prevention of theft of intellectual properties and customer data is a high priority for corporations and government…

The increasing prevalence of security attacks on software-intensive systems calls for new, effective methods for detecting and responding to these attacks. As one promising approach, game theory provides analytical tools for modeling the…

This paper proposes a resource-aware allocation model for layered intrusion detection in het erogeneous networks. Monitoring traffic at higher protocol layers improves the ability to detect sophisticated attacks, but it also increases…

Large networked systems are constantly exposed to local damages and failures that can alter their functionality. The knowledge of the structure of these systems is however often derived through sampling strategies whose effectiveness at…

Network interdiction problems are combinatorial optimization problems involving two players: one aims to solve an optimization problem on a network, while the other seeks to modify the network to thwart the first player's objectives. Such…

This paper considers a 2-player strategic game for network routing under link disruptions. Player 1 (defender) routes flow through a network to maximize her value of effective flow while facing transportation costs. Player 2 (attacker)…

In modern transportation networks, adversaries can manipulate routing algorithms using false data injection attacks, such as simulating heavy traffic with multiple devices running crowdsourced navigation applications, to mislead vehicles…

We study the vulnerability of dominating sets against random and targeted node removals in complex networks. While small, cost-efficient dominating sets play a significant role in controllability and observability of these networks, a fixed…

We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the…

We study a patrolling game played on a network $Q$, considered as a metric space. The Attacker chooses a point of $Q$ (not necessarily a node) to attack during a chosen time interval of fixed duration. The Patroller chooses a unit speed…