Related papers: Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks

We consider a two-player network inspection game, in which a defender allocates sensors with potentially heterogeneous detection capabilities in order to detect multiple attacks caused by a strategic attacker. The objective of the defender…

We consider a strategic network monitoring problem involving the operator of a networked system and an attacker. The operator aims to randomize the placement of multiple protected sensors to monitor and protect components that are…

We consider a zero-sum inspection game, in which a defender positions detectors across a critical system to detect multiple attacks caused by an attacker. We assume that detection is imperfect, and each detector location is associated with…

Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in a network for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fix them. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the network administrator should…

This paper addresses the security allocation problem in a networked control system under stealthy injection attacks. The networked system is comprised of interconnected subsystems which are represented by nodes in a digraph. An adversary…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic method to address the problem of optimal detector placement in a networked control system under cyber-attacks. The networked control system is composed of interconnected agents where each agent is…

We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor…

In large-scale networks, communication links between nodes are easily injected with false data by adversaries. This paper proposes a novel security defense strategy from the perspective of attack detection scheduling to ensure the security…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement against an adversary in uncertain networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…

We consider a game in which a strategic defender classifies an intruder as spy or spammer. The classification is based on the number of file server and mail server attacks observed during a fixed window. The spammer naively attacks (with a…

We introduce and study the problem of planning a trajectory for an agent to carry out a scouting mission while avoiding being detected by an adversarial guard. This introduces an adversarial version of classical visibility-based planning…

The security in networked systems depends greatly on recognizing and identifying adversarial behaviors. Traditional detection methods focus on specific categories of attacks and have become inadequate for increasingly stealthy and deceptive…

We consider the problem of a dynamical network whose dynamics is subject to external perturbations (`attacks') locally applied at a subset of the network nodes. We assume that the network has an ability to defend itself against attacks with…

We focus on adversarial patrolling games on arbitrary graphs, where the Defender can control a mobile resource, the targets are alarmed by an alarm system, and the Attacker can observe the actions of the mobile resource of the Defender and…

Attack detection problems in the smart grid are posed as statistical learning problems for different attack scenarios in which the measurements are observed in batch or online settings. In this approach, machine learning algorithms are used…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement for detecting cyber-attacks in networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…

This paper studies the sensor placement problem in a networked control system for improving its security against cyber-physical attacks. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game between an attacker and a detector. The attacker's…

Ensuring the security of networked systems is a significant problem, considering the susceptibility of modern infrastructures and technologies to adversarial interference. A central component of this problem is how defensive resources…

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…

It has been known that heterogeneous networks are vulnerable to the intentional removal of a small fraction of highly connected or loaded nodes, which implies that, to protect a network effectively, a few important nodes should be allocated…