Related papers: Invisible Trojan-horse attack
A quantum key distribution system may be probed by an eavesdropper Eve by sending in bright light from the quantum channel and analyzing the back-reflections. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a setup for mounting such a…
An eavesdropper Eve may probe a quantum key distribution (QKD) system by sending a bright pulse from the quantum channel into the system and analyzing the back-reflected pulses. Such Trojan-horse attacks can breach the security of the QKD…
The security of quantum communication using a weak coherent source requires an accurate knowledge of the source's mean photon number. Finite calibration precision or an active manipulation by an attacker may cause the actual emitted photon…
In the quantum version of a Trojan-horse attack, photons are injected into the optical modules of a quantum key distribution system in an attempt to read information direct from the encoding devices. To stop the Trojan photons, the use of…
The security proofs of the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols make certain assumptions about the operations of physical systems. Thus, appropriate modelling of devices to ensure that their operations are consistent with the models…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic technique that leverages principles of quantum mechanics to offer extremely high levels of data security during transmission. It is well acknowledged for its capacity to accomplish provable…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to exchange a secret key between two parties. Unlike classical cryptographic systems, the security of QKD is not reliant on computational assumptions but is…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to provide theoretically unconditional security for cryptographic key sharing. However, practical implementations remain vulnerable due to non-ideal devices and…
Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) disregard the effect of information leakage from the users' devices, and, thus, do not protect against Trojan-horse attacks (THAs). In a THA, the eavesdropper injects strong light into…
Vulnerabilities of components used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems affect its implementation security and must be taken into consideration during system development and security analysis. In this paper, we investigated…
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol has been demonstrated as a viable solution to detector side-channel attacks. One of the main advantages of MDI-QKD is that the security can be proved without making…
The discrete-variable QKD protocols based on BB84 are known to be secure against an eavesdropper, Eve, intercepting the flying qubits and performing any quantum operation on them. However, these protocols may still be vulnerable to…
In a quantum Trojan-horse attack (THA), eavesdroppers learn encoded information by injecting bright light into encoded or decoded devices of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. These attacks severely compromise the security of…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved to be information-theoretically secure in theory. Unfortunately, the imperfect devices in practice compromise its security. Thus, to improve the security property of practical QKD systems, a…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a theoretically secure method for cryptographic key exchange by leveraging quantum mechanics, but practical implementations face vulnerabilities such as Trojan horse attack on phase modulators. This…
General Trojan horse attacks on quantum key distribution systems are analyzed. We illustrate the power of such attacks with today's technology and conclude that all system must implement active counter-measures. In particular all systems…
Recently, Tsai et al. (Laser Phys. Lett. 17, 075202, 2020) proposed a lightweight authenticated semi-quantum key distribution protocol for a quantum participant to share a secret key with a classical participant. However, this study points…
Quantum key distribution(QKD) allows the legitimate partner to establish a secret key whose security only depends on physical laws. In recent years, research on QKD by employing insecure measurement devices, namely…
The theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a security loophole for most quantum key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that use a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultra-low-noise, high-efficiency…
Security analyses of quantum cryptographic protocols typically rely on certain conditions; one such condition is that the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) have isolated devices inaccessible to third parties. If an eavesdropper (Eve) has a…