Related papers: Popular Matching with Lower Quotas
We investigate the maximum happy vertices (MHV) problem and its complement, the minimum unhappy vertices (MUHV) problem. We first show that the MHV and MUHV problems are a special case of the supermodular and submodular multi-labeling…
We study the following general disjoint paths problem: given a supply graph $G$, a set $T\subseteq V(G)$ of terminals, a demand graph $H$ on the vertices $T$, and an integer $k$, the task is to find a set of $k$ pairwise vertex-disjoint…
An overview of current debates and contemporary research devoted to the modeling of decision making processes and their facilitation directs attention to the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). At the core of the AHP are various…
We present a polynomial-time $\frac{3}{2}$-approximation algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum-cardinality stable matching in a many-to-many matching model with ties and laminar constraints on both sides. We formulate our problem…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…
The presence of mean motion resonances (MMRs) complicates analysis and fitting of planetary systems observed through the radial velocity (RV) technique. MMR can allow planets to remain stable in regions of phase space where strong…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…
This paper has two objectives. One is to give a linear time algorithm that solves the stable roommates problem (i.e., obtains one stable matching) using the stable marriage problem. The idea is that a stable matching of a roommate instance…
The Surjective Homomorphism problem is to test whether a given graph G called the guest graph allows a vertex-surjective homomorphism to some other given graph H called the host graph. The bijective and injective homomorphism problems can…
We consider a variant of socially stable marriage problem where preference lists may be incomplete, may contain ties and may have bounded length. In real world application like NRMP and Scottish medical matching scheme such restrictions…
We propose a theoretical framework for consistent channel hopping algorithms to address the multichannel rendezvous problem (MRP) in wireless networks with heterogeneous available channel sets. A channel selection function is called…
A preference matrix $M$ has an entry for each pair of candidates in an election whose value $p_{ij}$ represents the proportion of voters that prefer candidate $i$ over candidate $j$. The matrix is rationalizable if it is consistent with a…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
The profile-based matching problem is the problem of finding a matching that optimizes profile from an instance $(G, r, \langle u_1, \dots, u_r \rangle)$, where $G$ is a bipartite graph $(A \cup B, E)$, $r$ is the number of utility…
In the stable marriage problem (SM), a mechanism that always outputs a stable matching is called a stable mechanism. One of the well-known stable mechanisms is the man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm (MGS). MGS has a good property that it…
We study control problems in the context of matching under preferences: We examine how a central authority, called the controller, can manipulate an instance of the Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates problems in order to achieve certain…
Robust model fitting plays a vital role in computer vision, and research into algorithms for robust fitting continues to be active. Arguably the most popular paradigm for robust fitting in computer vision is consensus maximisation, which…