Related papers: Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands
Consider a monopolist selling $n$ items to an additive buyer whose item values are drawn from independent distributions $F_1,F_2,\ldots,F_n$ possibly having unbounded support. Unlike in the single-item case, it is well known that the…
Recently the influence maximization problem has received much attention for its applications on viral marketing and product promotions. However, such influence maximization problems have not taken into account the monetary effect on the…
A seller chooses a reserve price in a second-price auction to maximize worst-case expected revenue when she knows only the mean of value distribution and an upper bound on either values themselves or variance. Values are private and iid.…
In this paper, we consider the revealed preferences problem from a learning perspective. Every day, a price vector and a budget is drawn from an unknown distribution, and a rational agent buys his most preferred bundle according to some…
We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. Contrary to the truthful and economically efficient…
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…
In the design and analysis of revenue-maximizing auctions, auction performance is typically measured with respect to a prior distribution over inputs. The most obvious source for such a distribution is past data. The goal is to understand…
With the increasing integration of power plants into the frequency-regulation markets, the importance of optimal trading has grown substantially. This paper conducts an in-depth analysis of their optimal trading behavior in sequential…
We consider a two-way trading problem, where investors buy and sell a stock whose price moves within a certain range. Naturally they want to maximize their profit. Investors can perform up to $k$ trades, where each trade must involve the…
In electricity markets, customers are increasingly constrained by their budgets. A budget constraint for a user is an upper bound on the price multiplied by the quantity. However, since prices are determined by the market equilibrium, the…
According to the main international reports, more pervasive industrial and business-process automation, thanks to machine learning and advanced analytic tools, will unlock more than 14 trillion USD worldwide annually by 2030. In the…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that, given samples from the unknown valuation distribution of each bidder, learns an auction that approximately maximizes the auctioneer's revenue in a variety of single-parameter auction environments…
We study an optimal liquidation problem with multiplicative price impact in which the trend of the asset's price is an unobservable Bernoulli random variable. The investor aims at selling over an infinite time-horizon a fixed amount of…
Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the…
A differentially private selection algorithm outputs from a finite set the item that approximately maximizes a data-dependent quality function. The most widely adopted mechanisms tackling this task are the pioneering exponential mechanism…
In this work we study the optimal execution problem with multiplicative price impact in algorithm trading, when an agent holds an initial position of shares of a financial asset. The inter-selling-decision times are modelled by the arrival…
Ad auctions in sponsored search support ``broad match'' that allows an advertiser to target a large number of queries while bidding only on a limited number. While giving more expressiveness to advertisers, this feature makes it challenging…
We present an extensive analysis of the key problem of learning optimal reserve prices for generalized second price auctions. We describe two algorithms for this task: one based on density estimation, and a novel algorithm benefiting from…
This paper reexamines the classic problem of revenue maximization in single-item auctions with $n$ buyers under the lens of the robust optimization framework. The celebrated Myerson's mechanism is the format that maximizes the seller's…
We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…