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Collective cooperation drives the dynamics of many natural, social, and economic phenomena, making understanding the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary game theory a central question of modern science. Although human interactions…
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…
Individuals interact and cooperate in structured systems. Many studies represent this structure using static networks, where each link represents a permanent connection between two nodes. However, real interactions are generally not…
The sampling of interaction partners depends on often implicit modelling assumptions, yet has marked effects on the dynamics in evolutionary games. One particularly important aspect is whether or not competitors also interact. Population…
When evolutionary games are contested in structured populations, the degree of each player in the network plays an important role. If they exist, hubs often determine the fate of the population in remarkable ways. Recent research based on…
Understanding the evolution of cooperation in structured populations represented by networks is a problem of long research interest, and a most fundamental and widespread property of social networks related to cooperation phenomena is that…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
Imitation is a basic updating mechanism for strategy evolution in structured populations, determining how individuals sample social information and translate it into behavioral changes. Higher-order networks, such as hypergraphs, generalize…
The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional…
It is well-known that population structure is a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation since individuals can reciprocate with their neighbors through local interactions defined by network structures. Previous research typically relies on…
We introduce a community network model which exhibits scale-free property and study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) on this network model. It is found that the frequency of cooperators decreases with the increment of the…
Networks with a scale-free degree distribution are widely thought to promote cooperation in various games. Herein, by studying the well-known prisoner's dilemma game, we demonstrate that this need not necessarily be true. For the very same…
Understanding cooperation in social dilemmas requires models that capture the complexity of real-world interactions. While network frameworks have provided valuable insights to model the evolution of cooperation, they are unable to encode…
It is well known that cooperation cannot be an evolutionary stable strategy for a non-iterative game in a well-mixed population. In contrast, structured populations favor cooperation since cooperators can benefit each other by forming local…
Networks determine our social circles and the way we cooperate with others. We know that topological features like hubs and degree assortativity affect cooperation, and we know that cooperation is favoured if the benefit of the altruistic…
Recent studies on the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in scale-free networks have demonstrated that the heterogeneity of the network interconnections enhances the evolutionary success of cooperation. In this paper we…
The structure of social networks is a key determinant in fostering cooperation and other altruistic behavior among naturally selfish individuals. However, most real social interactions are temporal, being both finite in duration and spread…
We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent.…
We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of cooperation--Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship network obtained from a social networking site. We demonstrate that such social network has small-world…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…