Related papers: Population games and Discrete optimal transport
Feedback loops between population dynamics of individuals and their ecological environment are ubiquitously found in nature, and have shown profound effects on the resulting eco-evolutionary dynamics. Incorporating linear environmental…
We study a system of Fokker-Planck equations recently introduced to describe the temporal evolution of statistical distributions of population densities with predator-prey interactions. At the macroscopic level, the system recovers a…
Dynamics of a social population is analyzed taking into account some physical constraints on individual behavior and decision making abilities. The model, based on Evolutionary Game Theory, predicts that a population has to pass through a…
This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…
We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or…
We consider a population dynamics model coupling cell growth to a diffusion in the space of metabolic phenotypes as it can be obtained from realistic constraints-based modelling. In the asymptotic regime of slow diffusion, that coincides…
In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the…
This note outlines a mean-field approach to dynamic optimal transport problems based on the recently proposed McKean-Pontryagin maximum principle. Key aspects of the proposed methodology include i) avoidance of sampling over stochastic…
Frequency-dependent selection reflects the interaction between different species as they battle for limited resources in their environment. In a stochastic evolutionary game the species relative fitnesses guides the evolutionary dynamics…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
Most existing works on transportation dynamics focus on networks of a fixed structure, but networks whose nodes are mobile have become widespread, such as cell-phone networks. We introduce a model to explore the basic physics of…
Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…
Motivated by the applications, a class of optimal control problems is investigated, where the goal is to influence the behavior of a given population through another controlled one interacting with the first. Diffusive terms accounting for…
We consider a Mean Field Games model where the dynamics of the agents is subdiffusive. According to the optimal control interpretation of the problem, we get a system involving fractional time-derivatives for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and…
The usual Langevin approach to describe systems driven by noise fails to describe the long time behavior of systems with multiple attractors. The solution of the associated linear Fokker-Planck equation is always unique, even though it…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…
Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an…
A common assumption employed in most previous works on evolutionary game dynamics is that every individual player has full knowledge about and full access to the complete set of available strategies. In realistic social, economical, and…
A new class of multi-player competitive stochastic games in discrete-time with an affine specification of the redistribution of payoffs at exercise is proposed and examined. Our games cover as a very special case the classic two-person…
We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…