Related papers: Universal Scalable Robust Solvers from Computation…
A mean-field game (MFG) seeks the Nash Equilibrium of a game involving a continuum of players, where the Nash Equilibrium corresponds to a fixed point of the best-response mapping. However, simple fixed-point iterations do not always…
In zero-sum games, the optimal strategy is well-defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, it is overly conservative when playing against suboptimal opponents and it can not exploit their weaknesses. Limited look-ahead game solving in…
Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different…
Adversarial regularization has been shown to improve the generalization performance of deep learning models in various natural language processing tasks. Existing works usually formulate the method as a zero-sum game, which is solved by…
A fundamental open problem in monotone game theory is the computation of a specific generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) among all the available ones, e.g. the optimal equilibrium with respect to a system-level objective. The existing GNE…
We consider linear problems in the worst case setting. That is, given a linear operator and a pool of admissible linear measurements, we want to approximate the values of the operator uniformly on a convex and balanced set by means of…
We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…
Robust self-testing in non-local games allows a classical referee to certify that two untrustworthy players are able to perform a specific quantum strategy up to high precision. Proving robust self-testing results becomes significantly…
We address the problem of Gaussian Process (GP) optimization in the presence of unknown and potentially varying adversarial perturbations. Unlike traditional robust optimization approaches that focus on maximizing performance under…
In this paper we formulate and solve a mean-field game described by a linear stochastic dynamics and a quadratic or exponential-quadratic cost functional for each generic player. The optimal strategies for the players are given explicitly…
We consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games with continuous sets of pure strategies and with first-order access to the payoff function. This problem arises for example in game-theory-inspired…
This paper presents a novel data-driven approach for approximating the $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in continuous-time linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games, where multiple agents interact with each other through their dynamics and…
This project investigates numerical methods for solving fully coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) of McKean-Vlasov type. Having numerical solvers for such mean field FBSDEs is of interest because of the…
We present a fully-distributed algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. The proposed scheme endows each agent with a gradient-based scheme equipped with a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the…
The problem of computing a common point that lies in the intersection of a finite number of closed convex sets, each known to one agent in a network, is studied. This issue, known as the distributed convex feasibility problem or the…
Linear inverse problems are ubiquitous. Often the measurements do not follow a Gaussian distribution. Additionally, a model matrix with a large condition number can complicate the problem further by making it ill-posed. In this case, the…
The intersection of Mean Field Games (MFGs) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) has fostered a growing family of algorithms designed to solve large-scale multi-agent systems. However, the field currently lacks a standardized evaluation…
This paper makes progress towards learning Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum Markov games from offline data. Specifically, consider a $\gamma$-discounted infinite-horizon Markov game with $S$ states, where the max-player has $A$…
Zero-sum Markov Games (MGs) has been an efficient framework for multi-agent systems and robust control, wherein a minimax problem is constructed to solve the equilibrium policies. At present, this formulation is well studied under tabular…
The study of learning in games typically assumes that each player always has access to all of their actions. However, in many practical scenarios, players' available actions might be restricted due to exogenous stochasticity. To model this…