Related papers: Online Market Intermediation
Consider learning a decision support assistant to serve as an intermediary between (oracle) expert behavior and (imperfect) human behavior: At each time, the algorithm observes an action chosen by a fallible agent, and decides whether to…
This paper compares two leading approaches for robust optimization in the models of online algorithms and mechanism design. Competitive analysis compares the performance of an online algorithm to an offline benchmark in worst-case over…
We present a novel agent-based approach to simulating an over-the-counter (OTC) financial market in which trades are intermediated solely by market makers and agent visibility is constrained to a network topology. Dynamics, such as changes…
We consider an online ad network problem in which an ad exchange auctions ad slots and intermediaries called demand side platforms (DSPs) buy these ad slots for their clients (advertisers). An intermediary represents multiple advertisers.…
We consider online procurement auctions, where the agents arrive sequentially, in random order, and have private costs for their services. The buyer aims to maximize a monotone submodular value function for the subset of agents whose…
Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mechanism--the fixed-price mechanism. Unlike the standard…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism…
We study scenarios where multiple sellers of a homogeneous good compete on prices, where each seller can only sell to some subset of the buyers. Crucially, sellers cannot price-discriminate between buyers. We model the structure of the…
This paper aims to investigate and achieve seller-side fairness within online marketplaces, where many sellers and their items are not sufficiently exposed to customers in an e-commerce platform. This phenomenon raises concerns regarding…
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…
In this work, we investigate online mechanisms for trading time-sensitive valued data. We adopt a continuous function $d(t)$ to represent the data value fluctuation over time $t$. Our objective is to design an \emph{online} mechanism…
In the online (time-series) search problem, a player is presented with a sequence of prices which are revealed in an online manner. In the standard definition of the problem, for each revealed price, the player must decide irrevocably…
We present pricing mechanisms for several online resource allocation problems which obtain tight or nearly tight approximations to social welfare. In our settings, buyers arrive online and purchase bundles of items; buyers' values for the…
This paper studies an online trading variant of the classical secretary problem, called secretary problem variant trading (SPVT), from the perspective of an intermediary who facilitates trade between a seller and $n$ buyers (collectively…
We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit-maximizing auction design literature as it requires no…
This paper combines two key ingredients for online algorithms - competitive analysis (e.g. the competitive ratio) and advice complexity (e.g. the number of advice bits needed to improve online decisions) - in the context of a simple online…
We consider the problem of dynamic pricing with limited supply. A seller has $k$ identical items for sale and is facing $n$ potential buyers ("agents") that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is interested in buying one item. Each…