Related papers: Informational Substitutes
This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…
Combinatorial games lead to several interesting, clean problems in algorithms and complexity theory, many of which remain open. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the area to encourage further research. In particular, we…
We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual ``satisfactions''. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded…
The problem of aggregating expert forecasts is ubiquitous in fields as wide-ranging as machine learning, economics, climate science, and national security. Despite this, our theoretical understanding of this question is fairly shallow. This…
Many decision problems in economics, information technology, and industry can be transformed to an optimal stopping of adapted random vectors with some utility function over the set of Markov times with respect to filtration build by the…
Matching plays a vital role in the rational allocation of resources in many areas, ranging from market operation to people's daily lives. In economics, the term matching theory is coined for pairing two agents in a specific market to reach…
We offer a new approach to the information decomposition problem in information theory: given a 'target' random variable co-distributed with multiple 'source' variables, how can we decompose the mutual information into a sum of non-negative…
Nowadays, several crowdsourcing projects exploit social choice methods for computing an aggregate ranking of alternatives given individual rankings provided by workers. Motivated by such systems, we consider a setting where each worker is…
Which ads should we display in sponsored search in order to maximize our revenue? How should we dynamically rank information sources to maximize value of information? These applications exhibit strong diminishing returns: Selection of…
As data-driven predictive models are increasingly used to inform decisions, it has been argued that decision makers should provide explanations that help individuals understand what would have to change for these decisions to be beneficial…
In a sequential decision-making problem, the information structure is the description of how events in the system occurring at different points in time affect each other. Classical models of reinforcement learning (e.g., MDPs, POMDPs)…
Covering and packing problems can be modeled as games to encapsulate interesting social and engineering settings. These games have a high Price of Anarchy in their natural formulation. However, existing research applicable to specific…
The topics treated in this thesis are inherently two-fold. The first part considers the problem of a market maker optimally setting bid/ask quotes over a finite time horizon, to maximize her expected utility. The intensities of the orders…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
Decomposition, i.e. independently analyzing possible subgames, has proven to be an essential principle for effective decision-making in perfect information games. However, in imperfect information games, decomposition has proven to be…
We analyze how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in binary-action coordination games. The designer offers an informational put: she stays silent if players choose her preferred action, but…
In statistical decision theory involving a single decision-maker, an information structure is said to be better than another one if for any cost function involving a hidden state variable and an action variable which is restricted to be…
For optimization models to be used in practice, it is crucial that users trust the results. A key factor in this aspect is the interpretability of the solution process. A previous framework for inherently interpretable optimization models…