Related papers: Evolutionary Stability of Reputation Management Sy…
Scientific coauthorship, generated by collaborations and competitions among researchers, reflects effective organizations of human resources. Researchers, their expected benefits through collaborations, and their cooperative costs…
We have studied the evolution of strategies in spatial public goods games where both individual (peer) and institutional (pool) punishments are present beside unconditional defector and cooperator strategies. The evolution of strategy…
Peer assessment systems are emerging in many social and multi-agent settings, such as peer grading in large (online) classes, peer review in conferences, peer art evaluation, etc. However, peer assessments might not be as accurate as expert…
Bitcoin-otc is a peer to peer (over-the-counter) marketplace for trading with bit- coin crypto-currency. To mitigate the risks of the p2p unsupervised exchanges, the establishment of a reliable reputation systems is needed: for this reason,…
Ranking systems have an unprecedented influence on how and what information people access, and their impact on our society is being analyzed from different perspectives, such as users' discrimination. A notable example is represented by…
There is general agreement that some form of regulation is necessary both for AI creators to be incentivised to develop trustworthy systems, and for users to actually trust those systems. But there is much debate about what form these…
Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. But if players are able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may sometimes act as a…
The concept of reputation is widely used as a measure of trustworthiness based on ratings from members in a community. The adoption of reputation systems, however, relies on their ability to capture the actual trustworthiness of a target.…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
Human cooperation persists among strangers in large, well-mixed populations despite theoretical predictions of difficulties, leaving a fundamental evolutionary puzzle. While upstream (pay-it-forward: helping others because you were helped)…
In many real world networks agents are initially unsure of each other's qualities and must learn about each other over time via repeated interactions. This paper is the first to provide a methodology for studying the dynamics of such…
This paper considers information sharing in a multi-player repeated game. Every round, each player observes a subset of components of a random vector and then takes a control action. The utility earned by each player depends on the full…
We use an evolutionary game model to study the interplay between corporate environmental compliance and enforcement promoted by the policy maker in a country facing a pollution trap, i.e., a scenario in which the vast majority of firms do…
There is a broad recognition that commitment-based mechanisms can promote coordination and cooperative behaviours in both biological populations and self-organised multi-agent systems by making individuals' intentions explicit prior to…
In networking and computing, resource allocation is typically addressed using classical sharing protocols as, for instance, the proportional division rule, the max-min fair allocation , or other solutions inspired by cooperative game…
The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem for evolutionary biology because cooperation is undermined by selfish cheaters (or "free riders") that profit from cooperators but do not invest any resources themselves. In a purely…
People make strategic decisions many times a day - during negotiations, when coordinating actions with others, or when choosing partners for cooperation. The resulting dynamics can be studied with learning theory and evolutionary game…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
The interdependence between an individual strategy decision and the resulting change of environmental state is often a subtle process. Feedback-evolving games have been a prevalent framework for studying such feedback in well-mixed…