Related papers: Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and…

We study fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores among agents with \emph{lexicographic} preferences -- a subclass of additive valuations. In sharp contrast to the goods-only setting, we show that an allocation satisfying…

We study a discrete-time financial market with a single constrained trader, competitive market makers, and noise traders. Within the class of linear equilibria, the equilibrium structure is shown to be uniquely determined by two state…

This paper studies fair division of divisible and indivisible items among agents whose cardinal preferences are not necessarily monotone. We establish the existence of fair divisions and develop approximation algorithms to compute them. We…

We study markets where firms compete for consumer attention by subsidizing costly product inspection. These subsidies do not change product quality, but they alter the order in which consumers search by lowering inspection costs. We…

Auction is applied for trade with various mechanisms. A simple but practical question is which mechanism, typically first-price or second-price auctions, is preferred from the perspective of bidders or sellers. A celebrated answer is…

We study fair allocation of indivisible chores (i.e., items with non-positive value) among agents with additive valuations. An allocation is deemed fair if it is (approximately) equitable, which means that the disutilities of the agents are…

We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents with additional conflict constraints. These are represented by a conflict graph where each item corresponds to a vertex of the graph and edges in the graph represent…

Public goods are often either over-consumed in the absence of regulatory mechanisms, or remain completely unused, as in the Covid-19 pandemic, where social distance constraints are enforced to limit the number of people who can share public…

We revisit the classical topic of quadratic and linear mean-variance equilibria with both financial and real assets. The novelty of our results is that they are the first allowing for equilibrium prices driven by general semimartingales and…

We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and present stronger…

The Walras approach to equilibrium focuses on the existence of market prices at which the total demands for goods are matched by the total supplies. Trading activities that might identify such prices by bringing agents together as potential…

We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this…

In fair division applications, agents may have unequal entitlements reflecting their different contributions. Moreover, the contributions of agents may depend on the allocation itself. Previous fairness notions designed for agents with…

We study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a multiset $\mathcal{M}$ of $t$ types of indivisible items among $d$ groups of agents, where all agents within a group have identical additive valuations. Gorantla et al. [GMV23] showed…

We formulate the problem of fair and efficient completion of indivisible goods, defined as follows: Given a partial allocation of indivisible goods among agents, does there exist an allocation of the remaining goods (i.e., a completion)…

We study a combinatorial market design problem, where a collection of indivisible objects is to be priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints.The classic solution concept for such problems is Walrasian…

In fair division problems, we are given a set $S$ of $m$ items and a set $N$ of $n$ agents with individual preferences, and the goal is to find an allocation of items among agents so that each agent finds the allocation fair. There are…

We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…

We discuss bundle auctions within the framework of an integer allocation problem. We show that for multi-unit auctions, of which bundle auctions are a special case, market equilibrium and constrained market equilibrium are equivalent…

To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the…