Related papers: CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache At…
Trusted execution environments (TEE) such as Intel's Software Guard Extension (SGX) have been widely studied to boost security and privacy protection for the computation of sensitive data such as human genomics. However, a performance…
Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) introduced new instructions to switch the processor to enclave mode which protects it from introspection. While the enclave mode strongly protects the memory and the state of the processor, it cannot…
Modern multi-core processors share cache resources for maximum cache utilization and performance gains. However, this leaves the cache vulnerable to side-channel attacks, where timing differences in shared cache behavior are exploited to…
We present a kernel-level infrastructure that allows system-wide detection of malicious applications attempting to exploit cache-based side-channel attacks to break the process confinement enforced by standard operating systems. This…
Novel confidential computing technologies such as Intel TDX, AMD SEV, and Arm CCA have recently emerged. In practice, due to its minimal trust boundaries, Intel SGX still remains widely used for enclave-based applications in cloud…
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) enables user-level code to create private memory regions called enclaves, whose code and data are protected by the CPU from software and hardware attacks outside the enclaves. Recent work introduces…
Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) offers software applications enclave to protect their confidentiality and integrity from malicious operating systems. The SSL/TLS protocol, which is the de facto standard for protecting transport-layer…
Last-level cache side-channel attacks have been mostly demonstrated in highly-controlled, quiescent local environments. Hence, it is unclear whether such attacks are feasible in a production cloud environment. In the cloud, side channels…
The latest generation of Intel processors supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX), a set of instructions that implements a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) right inside the CPU, by means of so-called enclaves. This paper presents…
Protected-module architectures (PMAs) have been proposed to provide strong isolation guarantees, even on top of a compromised system. Unfortunately, Intel SGX -- the only publicly available high-end PMA -- has been shown to only provide…
Caches are used to reduce the speed differential between the CPU and memory to improve the performance of modern processors. However, attackers can use contention-based cache timing attacks to steal sensitive information from victim…
The growth of cloud computing has revolutionized data processing and storage capacities to another levels of scalability and flexibility. But in the process, it has created a huge challenge of security, especially in terms of safeguarding…
Trusted Execution Environments, such as Intel SGX, use hardware supports to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of applications against a compromised cloud system. However, side channels like access patterns remain for adversaries to…
Intel SGX has been a popular trusted execution environment (TEE) for protecting the integrity and confidentiality of applications running on untrusted platforms such as cloud. However, the access patterns of SGX-based programs can still be…
Side-channel attacks on shared hardware resources increasingly threaten confidentiality, especially with the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs). In this work, we introduce Spill The Beans, a novel application of cache side-channels to…
Containers are becoming the de facto standard to package and deploy applications and micro-services in the cloud. Several cloud providers (e.g., Amazon, Google, Microsoft) begin to offer native support on their infrastructure by integrating…
Since its debut, SGX has been used in many applications, e.g., secure data processing. However, previous systems usually assume a trusted enclave and ignore the security issues caused by an untrusted enclave. For instance, a vulnerable (or…
Cache randomization has recently been revived as a promising defense against conflict-based cache side-channel attacks. As two of the latest implementations, CEASER-S and ScatterCache both claim to thwart conflict-based cache side-channel…
Modern processors dynamically control their operating frequency to optimize resource utilization, maximize energy savings, and conform to system-defined constraints. If, during the execution of a software workload, the running average of…
As cache-based side-channel attacks become serious security problems, various defenses have been proposed and deployed in both software and hardware. Consequently, cache-based side-channel attacks on processes co-residing on the same core…