Related papers: Mitigating the Curse of Correlation in Security Ga…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

We study a security game over a network played between a $defender$ and $k$ $attackers$. Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced…

Traditional game-theoretic research for security applications primarily focuses on the allocation of external protection resources to defend targets. This work puts forward the study of a new class of games centered around strategically…

The security game is a basic model for resource allocation in adversarial environments. Here there are two players, a defender and an attacker. The defender wants to allocate her limited resources to defend critical targets and the attacker…

Stackelberg Security Games are often used to model strategic interactions in high-stakes security settings. The majority of existing models focus on single-defender settings where a single entity assumes command of all security assets.…

This paper considers the problem of security allocation in a networked control system under stealthy attacks. The system is comprised of interconnected subsystems represented by vertices. A malicious adversary selects a single vertex on…

We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…

This paper investigates repeated win-lose coordination games (WLC-games). We analyse which protocols are optimal for these games, covering both the worst case and average case scenarios, i,e., optimizing the guaranteed and expected…

Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…

When securing complex infrastructures or large environments, constant surveillance of every area is not affordable. To cope with this issue, a common countermeasure is the usage of cheap but wide-ranged sensors, able to detect suspicious…

We introduce a novel framework for computing optimal randomized security policies in networked domains which extends previous approaches in several ways. First, we extend previous linear programming techniques for Stackelberg security games…

Interdicting a criminal with limited police resources is a challenging task as the criminal changes location over time. The size of the large transportation network further adds to the difficulty of this scenario. To tackle this issue, we…

Attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) which manipulate sensor readings can cause enormous physical damage if undetected. Detection of attacks on sensors is crucial to mitigate this issue. We study supervised regression as a means to…

This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…

The rapid growth of mobile social networks (MSNs) has significantly increased the demand for low-latency and reliable content delivery, motivating the deployment of edge caching systems. In practice, multiple content providers (CPs) compete…

Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern…

Security games model the confrontation between a defender protecting a set of targets and an attacker who tries to capture them. A variant of these games assumes security interdependence between targets, facilitating contagion of an attack.…

As has been shown elsewhere, a reasonable model of the loss of entanglement or correlation that occurs in quantum computations is one which assumes that they can effectively be predicted by a framework that presupposes the presence of…

Stackelberg security games are a critical tool for maximizing the utility of limited defense resources to protect important targets from an intelligent adversary. Motivated by green security, where the defender may only observe an…