Related papers: Efficient Strategy Computation in Zero-Sum Asymmet…

In statistical decision theory involving a single decision-maker, an information structure is said to be better than another one if for any cost function involving a hidden state variable and an action variable which is restricted to be…

We present a policy iteration algorithm for the infinite-horizon N-player general-sum deterministic linear quadratic dynamic games and compare it to policy gradient methods. We demonstrate that the proposed policy iteration algorithm is…

In this paper, we consider the $n \times n$ two-payer zero-sum repeated game in which one player (player X) employs the popular Hedge (also called multiplicative weights update) learning algorithm while the other player (player Y) adopts…

Pursuit-evasion scenarios appear widely in robotics, security domains, and many other real-world situations. We focus on two-player pursuit-evasion games with concurrent moves, infinite horizon, and discounted rewards. We assume that the…

Last-iterate convergence of learning dynamics in games has attracted significant recent attention. In two-player zero-sum games with bandit feedback, where only the loss of the selected action pair is observed, Fiegel et al. (2025) show a…

Consider a two-person zero-sum search game between a hider and a searcher. The hider hides among $n$ discrete locations, and the searcher successively visits individual locations until finding the hider. Known to both players, a search at…

We present a novel algorithm for game-theoretic trajectory planning, tailored for settings in which agents can only observe one another in specific regions of the state space. Such problems arise naturally in the context of multi-robot…

In the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, when every player has a different discount factor, the grim-trigger strategy is an equilibrium if and only if the discount factor of each player is higher than some threshold. What happens if the players…

We investigate quantum games in which the information is asymmetrically distributed among the players, and find the possibility of the quantum game outperforming its classical counterpart depends strongly on not only the entanglement, but…

We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. We say that two games are "strategically equivalent" if, for every…

In this paper, we consider a differential stochastic zero-sum game in which two players intervene by adopting impulse controls in a finite time horizon. We provide a numerical solution as an approximation of the value function, which turns…

We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…

In this paper, we establish the existence of optimal bounded memory strategy profiles in multi-player discounted sum games. We introduce a non-deterministic approach to compute optimal strategy profiles with bounded memory. Our approach can…

Probabilistic timed automata are a suitable formalism to model systems with real-time, nondeterministic and probabilistic behaviour. We study two-player zero-sum games on such automata where the objective of the game is specified as the…

In this work we apply methods from cryptography to enable any number of mutually distrusting players to implement broad classes of mediated equilibria of strategic games without the need for trusted mediation. Our implementation makes use…

We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…

Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many…

This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…

In this paper we study continuous-time two-player zero-sum optimal switching games on a finite horizon. Using the theory of doubly reflected BSDEs with interconnected barriers, we show that this game has a value and an equilibrium in the…

It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…