Related papers: Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cach…
Computer systems often provide hardware support for isolation mechanisms like privilege levels, virtual memory, or enclaved execution. Over the past years, several successful software-based side-channel attacks have been developed that…
In this paper, we reveal the existence of a new class of prefetcher, the XPT prefetcher, in the modern Intel processors which has never been officially documented. It speculatively issues a load, bypassing last-level cache (LLC) lookups,…
Modern multi-core processors share cache resources for maximum cache utilization and performance gains. However, this leaves the cache vulnerable to side-channel attacks, where timing differences in shared cache behavior are exploited to…
We present a new hardware-agnostic side-channel attack that targets one of the most fundamental software caches in modern computer systems: the operating system page cache. The page cache is a pure software cache that contains all…
Microarchitectural side channel attacks have been very prominent in security research over the last few years. Caches have been an outstanding covert channel, as they provide high resolution and generic cross-core leakage even with simple…
We present a software approach to mitigate access-driven side-channel attacks that leverage last-level caches (LLCs) shared across cores to leak information between security domains (e.g., tenants in a cloud). Our approach dynamically…
Last-level cache side-channel attacks have been mostly demonstrated in highly-controlled, quiescent local environments. Hence, it is unclear whether such attacks are feasible in a production cloud environment. In the cloud, side channels…
Dynamic partial reconfiguration enables multi-tenancy in cloud-based FPGAs, which presents security challenges for tenants, IPs, and data. Malicious users can exploit FPGAs for remote side-channel attacks (SCAs), and shared on-chip…
The Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology enables applications to run in an isolated SGX enclave environment, with elevated confidentiality and integrity guarantees. Gramine Library OS facilitates execution of existing unmodified…
Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) is a promising technology to securely process information in otherwise untrusted environments. An important aspect of Intel SGX is the ability to perform remote attestation to assess the…
The cloud computing landscape has evolved significantly in recent years, embracing various sandboxes to meet the diverse demands of modern cloud applications. These sandboxes encompass container-based technologies like Docker and gVisor,…
Mitigating memory-access attacks on the Intel SGX architecture is an important and open research problem. A natural notion of the mitigation is cache-miss obliviousness which requires the cache-misses emitted during an enclave execution are…
FPGA-based hardware accelerators are becoming increasingly popular due to their versatility, customizability, energy efficiency, constant latency, and scalability. FPGAs can be tailored to specific algorithms, enabling efficient hardware…
Intel SGX Guard eXtensions (SGX), a hardware-supported trusted execution environment (TEE), is designed to protect security-sensitive applications. However, since enclave applications are developed with memory unsafe languages such as…
Network slicing in 5G and the future 6G networks will enable the creation of multiple virtualized networks on a shared physical infrastructure. This innovative approach enables the provision of tailored networks to accommodate specific…
Modern x86 processors have many prefetch instructions that can be used by programmers to boost performance. However, these instructions may also cause security problems. In particular, we found that on Intel processors, there are two…
Caches are used to reduce the speed differential between the CPU and memory to improve the performance of modern processors. However, attackers can use contention-based cache timing attacks to steal sensitive information from victim…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow user processes to create enclaves that protect security-sensitive computation against access from the OS kernel and the hypervisor. Recent work has shown that TEEs are vulnerable to side-channel…
Modern GPU applications, such as machine learning (ML), can only partially utilize GPUs, leading to GPU underutilization in cloud environments. Sharing GPUs across multiple applications from different tenants can improve resource…
Hardware-based Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer an isolation granularity of virtual machine abstraction. They provide confidential VMs (CVMs) that host security-sensitive code and data. AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX enable CVMs and…