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We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…
We study a four species ecological system with cyclic dominance whose individuals are distributed on a square lattice. Randomly chosen individuals migrate to one of the neighboring sites if it is empty or invade this site if occupied by…
With deeper study of the Game Theory, some conditions of Prisoner's Dilemma is no longer suitable of games in real life. So we try to develop a new model-Villager's Dilemma which has more realistic conditions to stimulate the process of…
We explore some strategies which tend to perform well in the IPD. We start off by showing the significance of Tit-For-Tat strategies in evolutionary game theory. This is followed by a theoretical derivation of zero-determinant strategies,…
Since Press and Dyson's ingenious discovery of ZD (zero-determinant) strategy in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, several studies have confirmed the existence of ZD strategy in repeated multiplayer social dilemmas. However, few…
We revisit two evolutionary game theory models, namely the Prisoner and the Snowdrift dilemmas, on top of small-world networks. These dynamics on networked populations (individuals occupying nodes of a graph) are mainly concerning on the…
Matrix games like Prisoner's Dilemma have guided research on social dilemmas for decades. However, they necessarily treat the choice to cooperate or defect as an atomic action. In real-world social dilemmas these choices are temporally…
Exploring the possible consequences of spatial reciprocity on the evolution of cooperation is an intensively studied research avenue. Related works assumed a certain interaction graph of competing players and studied how particular…
Organisms may respond to local stimuli that benefit or threaten their fitness. The adaptive movement behaviour may allow individuals to adjust their speed to maximise the chances of being in comfort zones, where death risk is minimal. We…
We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population matching settings, respectively. Players choose strategies to maximize their subjective…
In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…
This paper is concerned with the death-birth updating process. This model is an example of a spatial game in which players located on the~$d$-dimensional integer lattice are characterized by one of two possible strategies and update their…
We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called `stochastic slowdown' effect, previously observed in (Altrock et. al, 2010) for simple evolutionary dynamics. Slowdown here refers to the fact that a…
The Prisoner's Dilemma, zero-sum games, LQR team problems, and differential games have shaped game theory in controls for decades, but the field's most pressing adversarial challenges demand a richer framework, and its name is Colonel…
This paper addresses a mathematically tractable model of the Prisoner's Dilemma using the framework of active inference. In this work, we design pairs of Bayesian agents that are tracking the joint game state of their and their opponent's…
In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or one randomly selected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is taken as reference, the information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, which…
The recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma sparked a surge of interest in the surprising fact that a player can exert unilateral control over iterated interactions. These remarkable strategies,…
In this paper we extend the framework of evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions dealing with the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the…
We introduce a coevolutionary framework in which punishment intensity dynamically adapts to the fraction of cooperators in the population. Unlike static models, adaptive punishment reshapes the effective payoff landscape, driving…