Related papers: A Bayesian Game without epsilon equilibria

We consider a formulation of a non zero-sum n players game by an n+1 players zero-sum game. We suppose the existence of the n+1-th player in addition to n players in the main game, and virtual subsidies to the n players which is provided by…

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

The non-local game scenario provides a powerful framework to study the limitations of classical and quantum correlations, by studying the upper bounds of the winning probabilities those correlations offer in cooperation games where…

We consider 2-players, 2-values minimization games where the players' costs take on two values, $a,b$, $a<b$. The players play mixed strategies and their costs are evaluated by unimodal valuations. This broad class of valuations includes…

A matrix-based framework for Bayesian games is presented, using semi-tensor product of matrices. Static Bayesian games are considered first. Matrix expression of Bayesian games is proposed. Three kinds of conversions, which convert Bayesian…

In this short note we give an example of a four-person finite positional game with perfect information that has no positions of chance and no Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. The corresponding directed graph has only one…

We study nondeterministic strategies in parity games with the aim of computing a most permissive winning strategy. Following earlier work, we measure permissiveness in terms of the average number/weight of transitions blocked by the…

Any nonempty, compact, semi-algebraic set in [0, 1] n is the projection of the set of mixed equilibria of a finite game with 2 actions per player on its first n coordinates. A similar result follows for sets of equilibrium payoffs. The…

Boolean games are an expressive and natural formalism through which to investigate problems of strategic interaction in multiagent systems. Although they have been widely studied, almost all previous work on Nash equilibria in Boolean games…

Player-Compatible Equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players' "trembles" onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by agents…

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…

Claude Shannon's zero-error communication paradigm reshaped our understanding of fault-tolerant information transfer. Here, we adapt this notion into game theory with incomplete information. We ask: can players with private information…

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…

We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…

We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure…

This work presents a novel policy iteration algorithm to tackle nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games arising naturally in many applications. Despite the obvious impact of solving such problems, there are no suitable numerical methods…

We consider two-player non-zero-sum linear-quadratic Gaussian games in which both players aim to minimize a quadratic cost function while controlling a linear and stochastic state process {using linear policies}. The system is partially…

In this paper, we consider a game beginning with a multiset of elements from a group. On a move, two elements are replaced by their sum. This is a no strategy game, and can be modeled as a graded poset with the rank of a node equal to the…

This paper explores the Nash equilibria of a variant of the Colonel Blotto game, which we call the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game. In the Colonel Blotto game, two players simultaneously distribute forces across $n$ battlefields. Within each…

We study nonzero-sum hypothesis testing games that arise in the context of adversarial classification, in both the Bayesian as well as the Neyman-Pearson frameworks. We first show that these games admit mixed strategy Nash equilibria, and…