Related papers: Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games

We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…

The classical model of signaling games assumes that the receiver exactly know the type space (private information) of the sender and be able to discriminate each type of the sender distinctly. However, the justification of this assumption…

We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…

I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is that in equilibrium she must be deterred from undetectably…

The spread of disinformation poses a significant threat to societal well-being. We analyze this phenomenon using an evolutionary game theory model of the sender-receiver game, where senders aim to mislead receivers and receivers aim to…

Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…

In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with…

We investigate the problem of learning an equilibrium in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents can adaptively choose their actions based on their assigned matches. Specifically, we consider a setting in which matched agents…

We conducted a laboratory experiment involving human subjects to test the theoretical hypothesis that equilibrium selection can be impacted by manipulating the games dynamics process, by using modern control theory. Our findings indicate…

This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…

This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…

We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different…

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium…

The replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes the change in a population's behaviors over time given suitable incentives. It arises when individuals make decisions using a simple learning process - imitation. A recent…

We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…

When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…

This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives benefits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort, which has no intrinsic value. The modelling of signalling in a dynamic context…

In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…

Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…