Related papers: A General Framework for Evaluating Callout Mechani…
Maximizing utility with a budget constraint is the primary goal for advertisers in real-time bidding (RTB) systems. The policy maximizing the utility is referred to as the optimal bidding strategy. Earlier works on optimal bidding strategy…
Visualization dashboards are increasingly used in strategic settings like auctions to enhance decision-making and reduce strategic confusion. This paper presents behavioral experiments evaluating how different dashboard designs affect bid…
A fundamental economic question is that of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms in dynamic environments. This paper considers a simple yet compelling market model to tackle this question, where forward-looking buyers arrive at the market…
Exploiting a precise reproduction of a stock exchange, the robustness of the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism, evaluated by means of the waiting time distributions, has been proved versus 36 different set ups made by varying both…
Auto-bidding is crucial in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. While previous work has made great efforts to model bidding environments for better ad performance, it has limitations in…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
Through the analysis of a dataset of ultra high frequency order book updates, we introduce a model which accommodates the empirical properties of the full order book together with the stylized facts of lower frequency financial data. To do…
In this era of abundant digital information, customer satisfaction has become one of the prominent factors in the success of any business. Customers want a one-click solution for almost everything. They tend to get unsatisfied if they have…
We briefly review our recent studies on stochastic processes modelling internet on-line trading. We present a way to evaluate the average waiting time between the observation of the price in financial markets and the next price change,…
Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do not take into account the fact that the power…
We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has shown that every agent can guarantee $1/2$ of their ideal…
We consider the fundamental scenario where a single item is to be sold to one of two agents. Both agents draw their valuation for the item from the same probability distribution. However, only one of them submits a bid to the mechanism. The…
On platforms where time-to-contract is itself payoff-relevant--Aalsmeer's flower auctions, ride-hailing dispatch, on-demand-labor matching--the textbook revenue equivalence between Dutch and first-price formats holds the trading outcome…
We consider the practical and classical setting where the seller is using an exploration stage to learn the value distributions of the bidders before running a revenue-maximizing auction in a exploitation phase. In this two-stage process,…
We study repeated bilateral trade when the valuations of the sellers and the buyers are contextual. More precisely, the agents' valuations are given by the inner product of a context vector with two unknown $d$-dimensional vectors -- one…
This paper extends the incomplete model of Haile and Tamer (2003) from static English auctions to sequential English auctions. Because bidders may wait for future opportunities, the static condition that bidders do not let rivals win at…
As computational agents are developed for increasingly complicated e-commerce applications, the complexity of the decisions they face demands advances in artificial intelligence techniques. For example, an agent representing a seller in an…