Related papers: Competitive division of a mixed manna
Allocating multiple scarce items across a set of individuals is an important practical problem. In the case of divisible goods and additive preferences a convex program can be used to find the solution that maximizes Nash welfare (MNW). The…
The problem of finding envy-free allocations of indivisible goods can not always be solved; therefore, it is common to study some relaxations such as envy-free up to one good (EF1). Another property of interest for efficiency of an…
We consider the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible items (goods or bads) under capacity constraints. In this setting, we are given a set of categorized items. Each category has a capacity constraint (the same for all…
A major problem in fair division is how to allocate a set of indivisible resources among agents fairly and efficiently. The goal of this work is to characterize the tradeoffs between two well-studied measures of fairness and efficiency --…
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…
Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game…
We study the chore division problem where a set of agents needs to divide a set of chores (bads) among themselves fairly and efficiently. We assume that agents have linear disutility (cost) functions. Like for the case of goods, competitive…
The existence of allocations that are fair and efficient, simultaneously, is a central inquiry in fair division literature. A prominent result in discrete fair division shows that the complementary desiderata of fairness and efficiency can…
In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) rule, which chooses an allocation maximizing the product of the agents' utilities, has received substantial attention for its fairness. We characterize MNW as the only…
We study the allocation of divisible goods to competing agents via a market mechanism, focusing on agents with Leontief utilities. The majority of the economics and mechanism design literature has focused on \emph{linear} prices, meaning…
We study fair resource allocation under a connectedness constraint wherein a set of indivisible items are arranged on a path and only connected subsets of items may be allocated to the agents. An allocation is deemed fair if it satisfies…
We study the relationship between two central concepts in the allocation of divisible goods: competitive equilibrium (CE) and allocations that maximize Nash welfare, i.e., allocations where the weighted geometric mean of the utilities is…
Allocating indivisible goods is a ubiquitous task in fair division. We study additive welfarist rules, an important class of rules which choose an allocation that maximizes the sum of some function of the agents' utilities. Prior work has…
We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX$_0$, EFX$^3$ and EF1$^3$ -…
We study the effects of data sharing between firms on prices, profits, and consumer welfare. Although indiscriminate sharing of consumer data decreases firm profits due to the subsequent increase in competition, selective sharing can be…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents. Prior research focuses on additive agent preferences, which leads to an impossibility when seeking truthfulness, fairness, and efficiency. We show that when agents have binary…
Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…
Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…
Recent results, establishing evidence of intractability for such restrictive utility functions as additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave, under both Fisher and Arrow-Debreu market models, have prompted the question of whether we…
Competitive equilibrium (CE) is a fundamental concept in market economics. Its efficiency and fairness properties make it particularly appealing as a rule for fair allocation of resources among agents with possibly different entitlements.…