Related papers: On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot…
We study the role of a market maker (or market operator) in a transmission constrained electricity market. We model the market as a one-shot networked Cournot competition where generators supply quantity bids and load serving entities…
We study decentralized markets with the presence of middlemen, modeled by a non-cooperative bargaining game in trading networks. Our goal is to investigate how the network structure of the market and the role of middlemen influence the…
Recent research in industrial organisation has investigated the essential place that middlemen have in the networks that make up our global economy. In this paper we attempt to understand how such middlemen compete with each other through a…
We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete \`a la Cournot, by…
We study an energy market composed of producers who compete to supply energy to different markets and want to maximize their profits. The energy market is modeled by a graph representing a constrained power network where nodes represent the…
Cournot competition is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility---a function of the production cost as well as market price of the…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
In this paper, we analyze the worst case efficiency loss of online platform designs under a networked Cournot competition model. Inspired by some of the largest platforms in operation today, the platform designs that we consider examine the…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
We investigate the impact of coalition formation on the efficiency of Cournot games where producers face uncertainties. In particular, we study a market model where firms must determine their output before an uncertain production capacity…
In the present work, we study the advertising competition of several marketing campaigns who need to determine how many resources to allocate to potential customers to advertise their products through direct marketing while taking into…
We study competition among contests in a general model that allows for an arbitrary and heterogeneous space of contest design, where the goal of the contest designers is to maximize the contestants' sum of efforts. Our main result shows…
We look at discovering the impact of market microstructure on equitability for market participants at public exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. Are these environments equitable venues for low-frequency participants…
We consider a variant of Cournot competition, where multiple firms allocate the same amount of resource across multiple markets. We prove that the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), which is symmetric and is…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…
We study scenarios where multiple sellers of a homogeneous good compete on prices, where each seller can only sell to some subset of the buyers. Crucially, sellers cannot price-discriminate between buyers. We model the structure of the…
We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and preferences of both the vendor and potential buyers are heterogeneous and possibly even antagonistic. Optimization of the joint benefit of the…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
Machine learning models play a key role for service providers looking to gain market share in consumer markets. However, traditional learning approaches do not take into account the existence of additional providers, who compete with each…
This paper studies the problem of intervention design for steering the actions of noncooperative players in quadratic network games to the social optimum. The players choose their actions with the aim of maximizing their individual payoff…