Related papers: The epsilon-delta game and the chess

A valuation for a player in a game in extensive form is an assignment of numeric values to the players moves. The valuation reflects the desirability moves. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest valuation.…

In this work, after given the definition of soft sets and their basic operations we define two person soft games which can apply to problems contain vagueness and uncertainty. We then give four solution methods of the games which are soft…

Weighted timed games are played by two players on a timed automaton equipped with weights: one player wants to minimise the accumulated weight while reaching a target, while the other has an opposite objective. Used in a reactive synthesis…

In the early 1950s Lloyd Shapley proposed an ordinal and set-valued solution concept for zero-sum games called \emph{weak saddle}. We show that all weak saddles of a given zero-sum game are interchangeable and equivalent. As a consequence,…

Delay games are two-player games of infinite duration in which one player may delay her moves to obtain a lookahead on her opponent's moves. For $\omega$-regular winning conditions it is known that such games can be solved in…

Mean field games are limit models for symmetric $N$-player games with interaction of mean field type as $N\to\infty$. The limit relation is often understood in the sense that a solution of a mean field game allows to construct approximate…

In this paper we develop the theory of how to count, in thin concurrent games, the configurations of a strategy witnessing that it reaches a certain configuration of the game. This plays a central role in many recent developments in…

Take a set of balls in $\mathbb R^d$. We find a subset of pairwise disjoint balls whose combined perimeter controls the perimeter of the union of the original balls. This can be seen as a boundary version of the Vitali covering lemma. We…

We provide a new version of delta theorem, that takes into account of high dimensional parameter estimation. We show that depending on the structure of the function, the limits of functions of estimators have faster or slower rate of…

Several results of large deviations are obtained for distributions that are associated with the Poisson--Dirichlet distribution and the Ewens sampling formula when the parameter $\theta$ approaches infinity. The motivation for these results…

We examine a two-person game we call Will-Testing in which the strategy space for both players is a real number. It has no equilibrium. When an infinitely large set of players plays this in all possible pairings, there is an equilibrium for…

We consider a sequential inspection game where an inspector uses a limited number of inspections over a larger number of time periods to detect a violation (an illegal act) of an inspectee. Compared with earlier models, we allow varying…

The predictability of a sequence is defined as the asymptotic performance of the best performing predictor in a given class. The value of the predictability of a sequence will in general depend on the choice of this predictor class. The…

Consider a 2-player normal-form game repeated over time. We introduce an adaptive learning procedure, where the players only observe their own realized payoff at each stage. We assume that agents do not know their own payoff function, and…

We study approachability theory in the presence of constraints. Given a repeated game with vector payoffs, we characterize the pairs of sets (A,D) in the payoff space such that Player 1 can guarantee that the long-run average payoff…

The "War of Attrition" is a classical game theoretic model that was first introduced to mathematically describe certain non-violent animal behavior. The original setup considers two participating players in a one-shot game competing for a…

We study $\varepsilon$-stability in continuous logic. We first consider stability in a model, where we obtain a definability of types result with a better approximation than that in the literature. We also prove forking symmetry for…

A new concept of an equilibrium in games is introduced that solves an open question posed by A. Neyman.

We propose a finite automaton-style solution concept for supergames. In our model, we define an equilibrium to be a cycle of state switches and a supergame to be an infinite walk on states of a finite stage game. We show that if the stage…

Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…