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The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional…
A noncooperative differential (dynamic) game model of opinion dynamics is proposed. In this game, the agents' motives are shaped by their expectations of the nature of others' opinions as well as how susceptible they are to get influenced…
The paper addresses a problem of sequential bilateral bargaining with incomplete information. We proposed a decision model that helps agents to successfully bargain by performing indirect negotiation and learning the opponent's model.…
We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…
We study the asymptotic behavior of deterministic, continuous-time imitation dynamics for population games over networks. The basic assumption of this learning mechanism -- encompassing the replicator dynamics -- is that players belonging…
Logit dynamics are dynamical systems describing transitions and equilibria of actions of interacting players under uncertainty. An uncertainty is embodied in logit dynamic as a softmax type function often called a logit function originating…
We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, although its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all…
Projected gradient ascent is known to satisfy no-external regret as a learning algorithm. However, recent empirical work shows that projected gradient ascent often finds the Nash equilibrium in settings beyond two-player zero-sum…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
Game-theoretic approaches and Nash equilibrium have been widely applied across various engineering domains. However, practical challenges such as disturbances, delays, and actuator limitations can hinder the precise execution of Nash…
This paper investigates the evolution of strategic play where players drawn from a finite well-mixed population are offered the opportunity to play in a public goods game. All players accept the offer. However, due to the possibility of…
We employ an n-player coordination game to model mutualism emergence and abandonment. We illustrate our findings in the context of the host--host interactions among plants in plant-mycorrhizal fungi (MF) mutualisms. The coordination game…
The evolutionary mechanisms of cooperative behavior represent a fundamental topic in complex systems and evolutionary dynamics. Real-world collective interactions, particularly in multi-agent systems, are often characterized by…
We study evolutionary games in a spatial diluted grid environment in which agents strategically interact locally but can also opportunistically move to other positions within a given migration radius. Using the imitation of the best rule…
We present a new family of logit-Q dynamics for efficient learning in stochastic games by combining the log-linear learning (also known as logit dynamics) for the repeated play of normal-form games with Q-learning for unknown Markov…
Two-vehicle racing is natural example of a competitive dynamic game. As with most dynamic games, there are many ways in which the underlying solution concept can be structured, resulting in different equilibrium concepts. The assumed…
We introduce a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria of competitive two-player games. Our method is a natural generalization of gradient descent to the two-player setting where the update is given by the Nash…
This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…
Nash equilibria are defined using uncorrelated behavioural or mixed joint probability distributions effectively assuming that players of bounded rationality must discard information to locate equilibria. We propose instead that rational…
Dynamic environments shape diverse dynamics in evolutionary game systems. We introduce spatial heterogeneity of resources into the prisoner's dilemma game model to explore coevolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback. The…