Related papers: Interpolating between matching and hedonic pricing…
We establish a general condition on the cost function to obtain uniqueness and Monge solutions in the multi-marginal optimal transport problem, under the assumption that a given collection of the marginals are absolutely continuous with…
Convex duality for two two different super--replication problems in a continuous time financial market with proportional transaction cost is proved. In this market, static hedging in a finite number of options, in addition to usual dynamic…
We consider two risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of an illiquid indivisible contingent claim in an incomplete semimartingale market environment. Under the assumption that the agents are exponential utility maximizers…
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…
We consider a financial market in discrete time and study pricing and hedging conditional on the information available up to an arbitrary point in time. In this conditional framework, we determine the structure of arbitrage-free prices.…
We study the design of a decentralized two-sided matching market in which agents' search is guided by the platform. There are finitely many agent types, each with (potentially random) preferences drawn from known type-specific…
Matching on covariates is a well-established framework for estimating causal effects in observational studies. The principal challenge stems from the often high-dimensional structure of the problem. Many methods have been introduced to…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
We study a sequential decision-making model where a set of items is repeatedly matched to the same set of agents over multiple rounds. The objective is to determine a sequence of matchings that either maximizes the utility of the least…
In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
Sponsored search mechanisms have drawn much attention from both academic community and industry in recent years since the seminal papers of [13] and [14]. However, most of the existing literature concentrates on the mechanism design and…
We present a primal-dual dynamical formulation of the multi-marginal optimal transport problem for (semi-)convex cost functions. Even in the two-marginal setting, this formulation applies to cost functions not covered by the classical…
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive…
A multidimensional optimization problem is formulated in the tropical mathematics setting as to maximize a nonlinear objective function, which is defined through a multiplicative conjugate transposition operator on vectors in a…
This paper studies a variant of ramified/branched optimal transportation problems. Given the distributions of production capacities and market sizes, a firm looks for an allocation of productions over factories, a distribution of sales…
We study the optimal mechanism design problem faced by a market intermediary who makes revenue by connecting buyers and sellers. We first show that the optimal intermediation protocol has substantial structure: it is the solution to an…
We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of {\em Bayesian optimal mechanism design} where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known…
This paper derives conditions under which preferences and technology are nonparametrically identified in hedonic equilibrium models, where products are differentiated along more than one dimension and agents are characterized by several…
Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…