Related papers: Consensus as a Nash Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game

A class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games with imperfect information structure is investigated. The game involves an arbitrary number of players, modeled as homogeneous Markov decision processes, aiming to find a sequential Nash…

One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…

The question of how people form their opinion has fascinated economists and sociologists for quite some time. In many of the models, a group of people in a social network, each holding a numerical opinion, arrive at a shared opinion through…

We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…

We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition equilibrium. We…

The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze the response actions of a set of players embedded in sub-networks in the context of interaction and learning. We characterize strategic network formation as a static game of…

In this paper, we study the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem of non-cooperative games in dynamic environments. Each player in the game aims to minimize its own time-varying cost function subject to a local action…

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…

We propose a continuous-time nonlinear model of opinion dynamics with utility-maximizing agents connected via a social influence network. A distinguishing feature of the proposed model is the inclusion of an opinion-dependent…

We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case when the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of…

In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding utilities, an equilibrium is a configuration where no agent can improve their utility by unilaterally switching to a different action. In…

In Social Networks, it is often interesting to study type of networks formed, its efficiency with respect to social objective and which networks are stable. Many work have already been there in this area. Players in network formation game…

This paper investigates a model of opinion formation on an adaptive social network, consisting of a system of coupled ordinary differential equations for individuals' opinions and corresponding network edge weights. A key driver of the…

Opinion dynamics models how the publicly expressed opinions of users in a social network coevolve according to their neighbors as well as their own intrinsic opinion. Motivated by the real-world manipulation of social networks during the…

Opinion dynamics aims to understand how individuals' opinions evolve through local interactions. Recently, opinion dynamics have been modeled as network games, where individuals update their opinions in order to minimize the social pressure…

In multi-agent dynamic games, the Nash equilibrium state trajectory of each agent is determined by its cost function and the information pattern of the game. However, the cost and trajectory of each agent may be unavailable to the other…

This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to…

Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos…

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

In this paper, Nash equilibrium seeking among a network of players is considered. Different from many existing works on Nash equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative games, the players considered in this paper cannot directly observe the…