Related papers: Quantum hashing is maximally secure against classi…
Cryptographic protocols, such as protocols for secure function evaluation (SFE), have played a crucial role in the development of modern cryptography. The extensive theory of these protocols, however, deals almost exclusively with classical…
Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptography: a sender S and a receiver R sharing a classical private key want to exchange a classical message with the guarantee that the message has not been modified by any third party…
In their seminal work on authentication, Wegman and Carter propose that to authenticate multiple messages, it is sufficient to reuse the same hash function as long as each tag is encrypted with a one-time pad. They argue that because the…
Modern authentication systems store hashed values of passwords of users using cryptographic hash functions. Therefore, to crack a password an attacker needs to guess a hash function input that is mapped to the hashed value, as opposed to…
One-way functions are central to classical cryptography. They are both necessary for the existence of non-trivial classical cryptosystems, and sufficient to realize meaningful primitives including commitments, pseudorandom generators and…
In 2013, Farid and Vasiliev [arXiv:quant-ph/1310.4922] for the first time proposed a way to construct a protocol for the realisation of "{\em Classical to Quantum}" one-way hash function, a derivative of the Quantum one-way function as…
Implementations of cryptographic libraries have been scrutinized for secret-dependent execution behavior exploitable by microarchitectural side-channel attacks. To prevent unintended leakages, most libraries moved to constant-time…
In quantum cryptography, the level of security attainable by a protocol which implements a particular task $N$ times bears no simple relation to the level of security attainable by a protocol implementing the task once. Useful partial…
Quantum public-key encryption [Gottesman; Kawachi et al., Eurocrypt'05] generalizes public-key encryption (PKE) by allowing the public keys to be quantum states. Prior work indicated that quantum PKE can be constructed from assumptions that…
Quantum tokens are underlying primitives for quantum money and network proposals, which leverage the no-cloning theorem to realize unforgeable authentication. A relevant but overlooked type of attack to such architectures is a hacker that…
Quantum computing offers significant acceleration capabilities over its classical counterpart in various application domains. Consequently, there has been substantial focus on improving quantum computing capabilities. However, to date, the…
One-way functions are fundamental to classical cryptography and their existence remains a longstanding problem in computational complexity theory. Recently, a provable quantum one-way function has been identified, which maintains its…
A central claim in quantum cryptography is that secrecy can be proved rigorously, based on the assumption that the relevant information-processing systems obey the laws of quantum physics. This claim has recently been challenged by…
Cryptography with quantum states exhibits a number of surprising and counterintuitive features. In a 2002 work, Barnum et al. argue that these features imply that digital signatures for quantum states are impossible (Barnum et al., FOCS…
We consider the scenario where Alice wants to send a secret (classical) $n$-bit message to Bob using a classical key, and where only one-way transmission from Alice to Bob is possible. In this case, quantum communication cannot help to…
In conventional cryptography, information-theoretically secure message authentication can be achieved by means of universal hash functions, and requires that the two legitimate users share a random secret key, which is twice as long as the…
Secure multi-party computing, also called "secure function evaluation", has been extensively studied in classical cryptography. We consider the extension of this task to computation with quantum inputs and circuits. Our protocols are…
We prove the security of quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of classical and…
Physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms leak information, which makes them vulnerable to so-called side-channel attacks. The problem of secure computation in the presence of leakage is generally known as leakage resilience. In…
We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. By adopting a rather strict definition of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes only - we can show that every strictly correct quantum protocol…