Related papers: Perturbation Robust Stable Matching
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
We say that an algorithm is stable if small changes in the input result in small changes in the output. This kind of algorithm stability is particularly relevant when analyzing and visualizing time-varying data. Stability in general plays…
Research on bias in machine learning algorithms has generally been concerned with the impact of bias on predictive accuracy. We believe that there are other factors that should also play a role in the evaluation of bias. One such factor is…
Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to design such incentive in these games is that the invitees…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents…
We investigate the stability of the Epstein-Zin problem with respect to small distortions in the dynamics of the traded securities. We work in incomplete market model settings, where our parametrization of perturbations allows for joint…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
We prove existence and uniqueness of solutions, continuous dependence from the initial datum and stability with respect to the boundary condition in a class of initial--boundary value problems for systems of balance laws. The particular…
We analyze the stability properties of equilibrium solutions and periodicity of orbits in a two-dimensional dynamical system whose orbits mimic the evolution of the price of an asset and the excess demand for that asset. The construction of…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
Stable matching theory is the foundation of centralized clearinghouses worldwide, from school choice programs to medical residency allocations. However, incorporating complex distributional goals-such as multi-dimensional diversity quotas…
In the stable marriage problem N men and N women have to be matched by pairs under the constraint that the resulting matching is stable. We study the statistical properties of stable matchings in the large N limit using both numerical and…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
A stable joint plan should guarantee the achievement of a designer's goal in a multi-agent environment, while ensuring that deviations from the prescribed plan would be detected. We present a computational framework where stable joint plans…
Search and matching increasingly takes place on online platforms. These platforms have elements of centralized and decentralized matching; platforms can alter the search process for its users, but are unable to eliminate search frictions…
We study how information perturbations can destabilize two-sided matching markets. In our model, agents arrive on the market over two periods, while agents in the first period do not know the types of those arriving later. Agents already…
For most people, social contacts play an integral part in finding a new job. As observed by Granovetter's seminal study, the proportion of jobs obtained through social contacts is usually large compared to those obtained through postings or…