Related papers: Perturbation Robust Stable Matching
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
Social storage systems are a good alternative to existing data backup systems of local, centralized, and P2P backup. In this paper, we look at two untouched aspects of social storage systems. One aspect involves modelling social storage as…
We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property…
Variational stability, in the sense of local good behavior of optimal values and solutions in problems of optimization under shifts in parameters, is important not only for validating model robustness in practical applications but also for…
We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching in which players may encounter unanticipated experiences. As they become aware of these experiences, they may change their preferences over players on the other side of the market.…
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…
The Stable Marriage Problem is to find a one-to-one matching for two equally sized sets of agents. Due to its widespread applications in the real world, especially the unique importance to the centralized match maker, a very large number of…
Super-stability is one of the stability concepts in the stable matching problem with ties. It is known that there may not exist a super-stable matching, and the existence of a super-stable matching can be checked in polynomial time. In this…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
We derive a sufficient condition for stability in probability of an equilibrium of a randomly perturbed map in ${\mathbb R}^d$. This condition can be used to stabilize weakly unstable equilibria by random forcing. Analytical results on…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
A method is suggested for treating those complicated physical problems for which exact solutions are not known but a few approximation terms of a calculational algorithm can be derived. The method permits one to answer the following rather…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
There are growing concerns that algorithms, which increasingly make or influence important decisions pertaining to individuals, might produce outcomes that discriminate against protected groups. We study such fairness concerns in the…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…