Related papers: Evolutionary Dynamics of Group Formation
Dynamics of a social population is analyzed taking into account some physical constraints on individual behavior and decision making abilities. The model, based on Evolutionary Game Theory, predicts that a population has to pass through a…
This brief discusses evolutionary game theory as a powerful and unified mathematical tool to study evolution of collective behaviours. It summarises some of my recent research directions using evolutionary game theory methods, which include…
Decision-making individuals often imitate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimize their own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete information. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have been reported as the…
This paper describes an agent-based model of a finite group of agents in a single population who each choose which convention to advocate, and which convention to practice. Influences or dependencies in agents choice exists in the form of…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies remains a challenging issue across disciplines. It is an important subject also in the evolutionary game theory to research how cooperation arises. The…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…
Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
We investigate an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game among self-driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at…
A new approach for the description of phenomena of social aggregation is suggested. On the basis of psychological concepts (as for instance social norms and cultural coordinates), we deduce a general mechanism for the social aggregation in…
Population structure affects the outcome of natural selection. Static population structures can be described by graphs, where individuals occupy the nodes, and interactions occur along the edges. General conditions for evolutionary success…
Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player doesn't have own authority to change…
Evolutionary game theory has proved to be a powerful tool to probe the self-organisation of collective behaviour by considering frequency-dependent fitness in evolutionary processes. It has shown that the stability of a strategy depends not…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and…
The emergence and prevalence of cooperative behavior within a group of selfish individuals remains a puzzle for \text{evolutionary game theory} precisely because it conflicts directly with the central idea of natural selection. Accordingly,…
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…
The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a…
This paper proposes an agent-based model which reproduces different structures of animal groups. The shape and structure of the group is the effect of simple interaction rules among individuals: each animal deploys itself depending on the…